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ABSTRACT
Over the last three decades, neoliberal restructuring of the economy created a
symbiosis of debt and discipline. New legal regimes and strategic use of monetary
policy displaced Keynesian welfare, facilitated financialization of the economy,
broke the power of organized labor, and expanded debt to sustain aggregate demand.
Public laws andpolicies created afield ofpossibility within which financial markets
extended their reach and brought ever-increasing sections of the working classes
and the marginalized within the ambit of the credit economy. Reordered public
policies and new norms of personal responsibility demarcated the horizon within
which the economically vulnerable pursued strategies of economic survival and
security. Neoliberalism deployed refashioned concepts of individual responsibility
and human capital to facilitate the assemblage of subjects who would engage the
financialized economy as risk-taking entrepreneurs. Faced with restructured labor
markets, wage pressures, and shrinking welfare, working classes found themselves
with little choice but to pay for their basic needs through debt. Engulfment in debt,
in turn, induced self-discipline and conformity with the logic of the financialized
economy and precarious labor markets. This ensemble sutured debt with discipline.
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Get them to invest their savings in their homes and own them. Then they won't leave
and they won't strike. It ties them down so they have a stake in our prosperity.
-Charles Harris Whitaker2
If history shows anything, it is that there's no better way to justify relations founded
on violence, to make such relations seem moral, than by reframing them in the
language of debt - above all, because it immediately makes it seem that it's the victim
who 's doing something wrong.
-David Graeber3
He who is subjected to afield of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility
for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself, he
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles;
he becomes the princple of his own subjection.
-Michel Foucault4
INTRODUCTION
B EFORE there was money, there was debt.' Before there was an American
republic, there was America's national debt.6 Over the last three
decades, the neoliberal reordering of political economy produced a "debtor
nation," a "republic of debtors," and an "American way of debt" resting
on a hypertrophied financial system.7 Pushed beyond the frontiers of
sustainability, this "empire of debt" induced a global financial meltdown.8
The subsequent cost of the public rescue of the financial industry in the
2 CHARLES HARRIS WHITAKER, TiE JOKE ABOUT HOUSING 9 (1920) (quoting the "Welfare
Director of a large company").
3 DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 5 (2011).
4 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 202-03 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
5 For over 5000 years, elaborate credit systems have been used to buy and sell goods-
long before the invention of coins or currency. The language of many ancient works of law and
religion-words like "guilt," "sin," and "redemption"--often derives from ancient debates
about debt, and shaped most basic ideas of right and wrong. GRAEBER, supra note 3, at 8.
6 See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, WHITE HOUSE BURNING: THE FOUNDING FATHERS,
OUR NATIONAL DEBT, AND WHY IT MAT7ERS TO You (2012); ROBERT E. WRIGHT, ONE NATION
UNDER DEBT: HAMILTON, JEFFERSON, AND THE HISTORY OF WHAT WE OWE (2008).
7 See MENZIE D. CHINN & JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, LOST DECADES: THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S
DEBT CRISIS AND THE LONG RECOVERY (2011); LouIs HYMAN, BORROW: TIHE AMERICAN WAY OF
DEBT (2012); LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK (2011);
ANYA KAMENETZ, GENERATION DEBT: WHY Now ISA TERRIBLE TIME TO BE YOUNG (2006); BRUCE
H. MAN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRU7TCrY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2002);
ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA's ADDICTION TO
CREDIT (2OOO).
8 WILLIAM BONNER & ADDISON WIGGIN, THE NEW EMPIRE OF DEBT: THE RISE AND FALL OF
AN EPIC FINANCIAL BUBBLE (zd ed. 2009).
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United States alone stands at 7.77 trillion dollars,9 and the credit worthiness
of the United States has been put into question. 10 The meltdown-induced
Great Recession sharply increased income and wealth inequality" and
has hit the working classes and racial minorities particularly hard.'2 The
number of those living in poverty in America stands at 46.2 million," and
many cannot even afford a burial and are choosing cremation instead.
14
The financial crisis metastasized into pervasive fiscal crises, prompting
declarations of "financial martial law" and renewed assaults on the working
9 Gretchen Morgenson, Secrets of the Bailout, Now Told, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 4, 201 1, at BU I.
Global losses in the financial sector alone exceed USD 3.4 trillion. INT'L MONETARY FUND,
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD 5 (Oct.
2oo9), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2o9/o2/pdf/text.pdf. The bill for
worldwide public rescue of financial institutions is USD 20 trillion. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD
ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2010, xii-xiii (201 o). The long-term total potential cost
ofjust the U.S. taxpayers' rescue of finance capital is USD23.7 trillion-over 150% of GDP, as
estimated by the special inspector general for TARP. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANK-
ERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 174 (2010).
IO See BONNER & WIGGIN, supra note 8; Binyamin Appelbaum, Fed Chief Says Politics Hurt
Markets andNation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2011, at As; Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Dash, S &P
Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for the First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2o I, at A l.
I I See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BE-
TWEEN 1979 AND 2007, at 11-12 (2oI I), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbo-
files/attachments/I o-z 5-Householdlncome.pdf; Timothy Noah, The United States of Inequality,
SLATE (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:06 PM), http://wwwslate.com/artices/news-and-politics/the-grear-di-
vergence/features/2o I o/the-united-states_ofjinequality/introducingthe-greatdivergence.
html.
12 The wealth gap between racial groups has risen to record highs. See RAKESH KOCHHAR
ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN
WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS I (201 I), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2o69/hous-
ing-bubble-subprime-mortgages-hispanics-blacks-household-wealth-disparity. In 2oio,
about one and a half million people in the U.S. declared bankruptcy and suicide rates are
on the rise. Fred Magdoff, The Jobs Disaster in the United States, MONTHLY REV., June 2011 , at
24, 37 n.1. In August 2011 , the unemployment rate was 8.o% for whites, 16.7% for blacks,
11.3% for Hispanics, and 7.1% for Asians. Shaila Dewan, Zero Job Growth Latest Bleak Sign for
U.S.'Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, at Ai. In 2009, 35% of Black households and 31% of
Latino households had zero or negative wealth, compared with 15% for whites. Desmond S.
King & Rogers M. Smith, On Race, The Silence Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 201 , at A2 I.
Worldwide job losses could hit a staggering 50 million by 2009. Nelson D. Schwartz, Unem-
ployment Surges around the World, Threatening Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2oo9, at AI. Jobless
rates among blacks have consistently been about double those of whites; in October the black
unemployment rate was 15. 1%, compared with 8% for whites. Timothy Williams, Public Sector
Sheds Jobs; Blacks Are Hit Hardest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at AI 6.
13 KRISTIN SEEFELD, ET AL., AT RISK: AMERICA'S POOR DURING AND AFTER THE GREAT
RECESSION 5 (2012), available at http://www.tavistalks.com/remakingamerica/wp-content/up-
loads/2ol I/I 2/Indiana-University White-PaperEMBARGOED-UNTIL-WED__JAN.-
I I-AT-8AMi.pdf.
14 Cremation is chosen over burial in 41% of American deaths, up from 15% in 1985.
For one-third of those who chose cremation in zoIo, cost was the primary factor. Kevin Sack,
In Tough Times, a Boom in Cremations as a Way to Save Money, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at A1.
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classes."5 Lower incomes and increased poverty have rendered the 2000s
a "lost decade." 16 A sluggish economy with high unemployment is the
"new normal," 7 with prospects of a steep and lasting drop in wages.' The
search for culprits has turned into a rush to round up the usual suspects. 9
Personal greed, corrupt financiers, imprudent investors, and unworthy
homeowners are the favored targets."0 There is scant recognition that the
current financial crisis is a symptom of the structural crisis of capitalism"'
and that we stand at "a transformative moment in global economic history
15 Exemplary is the Michigan legislation, dubbed "financial martial law" by a legis-
lator, which empowers the governor to declare a "financial emergency" in towns or school
districts. He could then appoint an emergency financial manager who can fire local elected
officials, break contracts, seize and sell assets, eliminate services - and even eliminate whole
cities or school districts without any public input. See Stephanie Condon, Michigan Bill Would
Impose "Financial Martial Law," CBS NEWS (Mar. 1I, 2011 ), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503544_i 62-20042299-5o3544.html ; Andy Kroll, Behind Michigan's "Financial Martial Law:"
Corporations and Right-Wing Billionaires, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 23, 2oi I), http://motherjones.
com/politics/20ol/OD/michigan-snyder-mackinac--center; Chad Selweski, Michigan Senate
Passes Emergency Manager Bills, DAILY ThIn., http://www.dailytribune.com/article/201 I0Iol
NEWS/3o3io99 94/michigan-senate-passes-emergency-manager-bills (last updated April
10, 2012, 8:58 PM). A primary objective of declaring financial emergencies is to give emergen-
cy managers "the ability to set aside contracts with public workers' unions." Monica Davey,
Detroit's Mayor Says Budget Gap May Require Emergency Manager, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at
Ai 5 . These measures are helping states and local governments to replace public employees
with contract workers "who will do the same job for less." Motoko Rich, A Hidden Tollas States
Shift to Contract Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at AI. Concurrently, assaults on organized
labor have picked up pace. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Indiana Governor Signs a Law Creating a
'Right to Work' State, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, at AI 2.
I6 Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2011, at As.
17 See Magdoff, supra note 12, at 26, 36; Jason DeParle et al., Older Suburban and Strug-
gling: 'Near Poor' Startle the Census, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2oI I, at Ai; Sabrina Tavernise, Middle-
Class Areas Shrink as Income Gap Grows, New Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 20 1, at As6;
see also David McNally, Slump, Austerity and Resistance, 48 SOCIALIST REG. 36, 39 Fig. 1 (2012)
(comparing employment recoveries, following recessions between 1974 and 2011).
18 Sudeep Reddy, Downturn's Ugly Trademark: Steep, Lasting Drop in Wages, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. I1, 2011 ), http:/online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304248704575574213897770
83o.html.
19 Timothy J. Sinclair, Round Up the Usual Suspects: Blame and the Subprime Crisis, 15 NEW
POL. ECON. 91,92, 104 (2010).
20 See, e.g., CHARLES H. FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITI-
CAL CORRUPTION, AND THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA (2012); GRETCHEN MORGENSON & JOSHUA
ROSNER, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT: How OUTSIZED AMBITION, GREED, AND CORRUPTION LED
TO ECONOMIC ARMAGEDDON (2011); andrd douglas pond cummings, Racial Coding and the Fi-
nancialMarket Crisis, 2o1 UTAH L. REV. 141, 203-10 (2011), for the tendency to blame racial
minorities.
21 "The economic and financial crisis of the late 2000S was not an accident nor the mere
result of a banking system that had escaped control. It was a moment of revelation, one that
exposed the systemic contradictions with which global capitalism has been struggling for de-
cades." ALEX CALLINICOS, BONFIRE OF ILLUSIONS: THE TWIN CRISES OF T14E LIBERAL WORLD 94
(2010).
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whose ultimate resolution will likely reshape politics and economics for at
least a generation.""2 Pressing systemic and structural questions confront
us: Why, when, and how did a debt-driven financialized economy come
about? What changes in the labor markets induced the working classes to
turn to debt? How were the working and marginalized classes incorporated
into the circuits of credit? What was the impact of this incorporation? This
article explores these questions by bringing into relief the production of a
debt-fueled financialized economy and the laws and public policies that
made this possible.
This article argues that neoliberalism, a reorganization of capitalism to
secure hegemony of finance capital, 3 is a project of the wealth-owning
classes to reverse the setbacks they had suffered during the era of Keynesian
welfare. This transformation entailed a rollback of the welfare state, an
attack on the power of organized labor, precarization of labor markets,
4
financialization of the economy, and exponential expansion of debt. 5 In this
ensemble, debt sustained aggregate demand, fueled liquidity to lubricate
financialization, and facilitated assemblage of entrepreneurial subjects
responsible for their own economic security. Public welfare was replaced by
self-care and working classes were constrained to fund their private welfare
through private debt, while calibrating their conduct with the demands of
precarious labor markets. Debt, no longer a private choice but a structural
imperative, became an instrument of control and discipline. Subprime
mortgages that engulfed dispossessed communities are emblematic of the
symbiosis of debt and discipline forged by public policies and the market
working in concert. This neoliberal concord between debt and discipline
underscores that economics is always entwined with politics, with the law
as a primary suture between the two.
6
In order to substantiate these arguments, this article first outlines
a conceptual framework suitable to explore the relationship between
debt and discipline. It then focuses on the transition from Keynesian to
neoliberal response to the chronic demand-deficit problem of capitalism:
while Keynesianism prescribed full-employment and raising wages,
neoliberalism relies on consumer debt induced by wage-compression
and contraction of public welfare. The article then recounts the genesis of
22 CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF,' IIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTU-
RIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 208 (2009).
23 See discussion infra Part II.
24 See discussion infra Part III.
•25 See discussion infra Part II, lII, IV.
26 See DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 137-182 (2003); MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE
INVENTION OF CAPITALISM: CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND lMIE SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMI-
TIVE ACCUMULATION (2000); Jim Glassman, Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Disposses-
sion, Accumulation by 'Extra-Economic' Means, 30 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 608, 613-16
(2oo6); Michael Perelman, Primitive Accumulation from Feudalism to Neoliberalism, CAPITALISM
NATURE SOCIALISM, June 2007, at 44.
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neoliberalism by focusing on the radical use of.monetary policy-to trigger
the transition from Keynesian welfare to the hegemony of finance, break
the power of organized labor, and put downward pressure on wages. It
then focuses on the role of law and public policy in forging a link between
financialization of the economy and entrapment of the working classes in
relationships of debt including subprime mortgages. Next, it brings into
relief the increasingly precarious labor markets that add to the pressure on
the working classes to turn to debt. Finally, it explores the role of debt in
the assemblage of compliant subjects disciplined to conform to the logic of
precarious labor markets.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This article combines insights of critical political economy with the
conceptual toolkit of Michel Foucault to analyze the connection between
debt and discipline. While critical political economy helps uncover
macro-level neoliberal economic transformations, Foucault's constructs
focus on the attendant micro-level processes of market-mediated
subject formation. 7 Of particular utility are Foucault's constructs of
governmentality, bio-power, and assemblage of self-caring subjects
through "modes of subjectivation ... in which people are invited or incited
to recognize their moral obligations." 8
Governmentality refers to "techniques and procedures for directing
human behavior" 9 and concerns the proper arrangement of the dynamic
field of exchange of "individuals, goods, and wealth."3 The construct trains
on the practice of "economic government," where the economy designates
"a field of intervention for government. ' 31 While at a general level it
refers to "any manner in which people think about, and put into practice,
calculated plans for governing themselves and others," more specifically it
refers to the ensemble of technologies of governance that aim at "the care
and maximization of the potential of the population."3 Biopower emerges
from the shift of focus in modern societies from "an exhaustive and unitary
project of police.., to the economy as a domain of naturalness. '33 Taken
together, biopower and governmentality "refer to a manner of exercising
power over a population that is directed towards maximizing its potential
27 See discussion infra Part V.
28 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 264 (Paul Rabinow ed., Robert
Hurley et al. trans., 1998).
29 Id. at 81.
30 MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE
FRANCE, 1977-78 94 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2007).
31 Id. at 95.
32 BEN GOLDER & PETER FITZPATRICK, FOUCAULT'S LAW 31 (2009).
33 FOUCAULT, supra note 3o , at 354.
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and optimizing its capacities."' This frame where the economy displaces
sovereignty as the primary field of governance is particularly useful to
examine neoliberal political economy. It posits that homo economicus
reappears under neoliberalisrn not only as a "partner of exchange" but as
"an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself."35 Subjected to the incentive
structure of the market this entrepreneur is "eminently governable.
36
This article deploys this Foucauldian conceptual toolkit to explore the
connection between the aggregate demand problem of capitalism and the
disciplinary impact of private debt upon working classes caught between
shrinking wages and neoliberal demands of individual responsibility and
self-sufficiency.
An obstacle to any fruitful use of Foucault to analyze the debt-discipline
combine is his underestimation of the role of law and the state in the
exercise of power.3 Foucault holds that "[d]isciplines will define not a code
34 GOLDER & FITZPATRICK, Shpra note 32, at 32.
35 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE,
1978-1979 226 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2oo8).
36 Id. at 270.
37 For detailed articulation of this argument, see ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKMAN, Fou-
CAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE (1994); Alan Hunt, Foucault's
Expulsion of Law: Towardsa Retrieval, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 1 (1992). For a detailed exami-
nation of what they term the "expulsion thesis," see GOLDER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 32, at
11-52. Some read Foucault as implying a "radical discontinuity" or "mutual incompatibility"
between law and disciplinary power. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 117-18
(993); BOAVENTURA DE SAUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOEALIZA-
TION, AND EMANCIPATION 5 (2d ed. 2002). In sum, the critique is that Foucault "led to underes-
timate at the very least the role of law in the exercise of power within modern societies;.., he
also underestimates. the role of the State itself." Nicos POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM
77 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2000).
For productive use of Foucauldian approaches to analyze the economy, see PAT O'MALLEY,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND GOVERNMENT (2004); MICHAEL POWER, INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUN-
TANTS IN ENGLAND & WALES, CTR. FOR Bus. PERFORMANCE,ThE AUDIT IMPLOSION: REGULATING
RISK FROM THE INSIDE (2000), available at http://www.icaew.com/-/media/Files/Technical/Re-
search-and-academics/publications-and-projects/audit-and-assurance-pubicationsbrief-
ing-the-audit-implosion.pdf; PAT O'MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND GOVERNMENT (2004);
Richard Ericson, Dean Barry & Aaron Doyle, The Moral Hazards of Neoliberalism: Lessons
from the Private Insurance Industry, 29 ECON. & SOC. 532 (2000); Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose,
Governing Economic Life, 19 ECON. & Soc. I ( 199o). Representative deployments of Foucault
in contemporary legal scholarship include Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the
Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753,
771-73 n.34, 45 (1994); Christine Bateup, Power v the State: Some Cultural Foucauldian Reflec-
tions on Administrative Law, Corporatisation and Privatization, 3 S. CROSS U. L. REV. 85 (1999);
Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law Into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 449, 449
(1996); Tony Evans, International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge, 27 H UM. RTS. Q. 1046,
1050-51 (2005); Jonathan Simon, "In Another Kind of Wood": MichelFoucaultand SociolegalStud-
ies, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 49 (1992); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1431, 1478-81 (1992).
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of law, but a code of normalization."38 He insists that modern techniques
of normalization "develop from and below a system of law, in its margins
and maybe even against it." 9 He sees liberal political economics driving "a
formidable wedge" between the powers of the state and the sphere of daily
human life.4" Contrary to Foucault's designation of a capitalist economy
as a "neutral area," my position is that capitalism is not a de-politicized
and de-subjectified market governed solely by "economic laws" but a set
of politically contested social relations under the hegemony of capital.
Mainstream discourses conflate capitalism and markets and see markets as
entities with force and agency of their own.41 1 argue instead that capitalism
is a relation of power where the state and the market remain intertwined.
Rather than directly determining subjectivities, 4 governmentality forms a
"habitat of subjectification" within fields of operation demarcated by law. 43
Foucault comes closer to this position when he acknowledges that operations
of power constitute "a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental
management, which has population as its main target."44 Indeed, he posits
that these modalities of power are "deployed coterminously, and in complex
contextual amalgams.
4
In this schema, the state and the law do not evaporate, but are rather
"welded to substantive, normalizing, disciplinary and bio-political
objectives having to do with the re-shaping of individual and collective
conduct in relation to particular substantive conceptions of desirable
38 MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED": LECTURES AT THE COLLkGE DE
FRANCE, 1975-76 38 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., 2003).
39 FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 56.
40 MICHEL FOUCAULT, 'THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITIcs: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE,
1978-1979 17 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2010).
41 LOWELL BRYAN & DIANA FARRELL, MARKET UNBOUND: UNLEASHING GLOBAL CAPITALISM
21 (1996). Capital and capitalism are often presented as "large, powerful, persistent, active,
expansive, progressive, dynamic, transformative; embracing, penetrating, disciplining, colo-
nizing, constraining; systemic, self-reproducing, rational, lawful, self-rectifying; organized and
organizing, centered and centering; originating, creative, protean; victorious and ascendant;
self-identical, self-expressive, full, definite, real, positive, and capable of conferring identity
and meaning." J. K. GIBSON-GRAHAM, THE END OF CAPITALISM (As WE KNEW IT): A FEMI-
NIST CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1996). In the neoliberal era, there is an increasing
tendency to treat economic policy as a technical rather than a political matter. See DIMITRIS
MILONAKIS & BEN FINE, FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY TO ECONOMICS: METHOD, THE SOCIAL AND
THE HISTORICAL IN THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY (2009). Polanyi, in his critique of the
"free market," reminded us that "[t]here was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets
could never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course.... [L]ais-
sez-faire itself was enforced by the state .... Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not."
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME 145-47 (Beacon 2d ed. 2001).
42 See infra Part V.
43 NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 178 (1999).
44 FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 107-o8.
45 GEORGE PAVLICH, GOVERNING PARADOXES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 9 (2005).
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ends. '46 Public policies promote an incentive structure conducive to "the
shaping and reshaping of conduct" by configuring the range of choices
within which individuals choose to conduct themselves.47 Neoliberalism,
"a political project that endeavors to create a social reality that it suggests
already exists, '48 aims to produce subjects who, under conditions of apparent
autonomy, make choices to perform in ways that are in tune with market
imperatives. Neoliberal disciplinary regimes aim to constitute rationally
calculating individuals who bear full responsibility for the consequences
of their actions; subjects who voluntarily embrace particular choices and
behaviors conducive to sustaining the socio-economic order. Promotion
of self-disciplined entrepreneurial behavior becomes a primary task of
governance. The confluence of debt and discipline demonstrates that
neoliberalism has transformed the state rather than diminishing it: "the
outcome [is] not implosion but reconstitution."49 This article argues that in
the neoliberal era the hidden hand of the market and the iron fist of the law
work in concert to forge governmentalities that suture debt with discipline.
II. FROM KEYNESIAN COMPROMISE TO NEOLIBERAL COUNTERREVOLUTION
It is often claimed that neoliberalism is "more an ethos or an ethical
ideal[] than a set of completed or established institutions."5 Ostensibly,
the central political tenet of neoliberalism is "the negative unity of the
disempowerment of government: it disables the state from interfering
with the established order of society."'" I discern, instead, a "programmatic
coherence"5 in the neoliberal socio-economic transition in the U.S. that
can be seen, following Karl Polanyi, as historical alternation of stages of
de-socialization, re-socialization and a new de-socialization.5 3 In these
46 Nicholas Rose & Mariana Valverde, Governedby Law?, 7 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 541, 543
(1998).
47 MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY 18 (1999).
48 Thomas Lemke, The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michel Foucault's Lecture at the College de
France on Neo-Liberal Governmentaity, 30 ECON. & Soc'v 190, 203 (2001).
49 Jamie Peck & Adam Tickell, Neoliberalizing Space, 34 ANTIPODE 380, 388-89 (2002).
50 Mitchell Dean, Sociology After Society, in SOCIOLOGY AFTER POSTMODERNISM 205, 212
(David Owen ed., 1997). It is claimed that only when "reified," neoliberalism "takes on the
denotation of a concrete abstraction, an accomplished object, a totalizing ideological forma-
tion; even, in its temporal dimension, an epoch." John Comaroff, The End of Neoliberalism?
What is Left of the Left, 637 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCl. 141,142 (2011 ).
51 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE
58 (1998).
52 Barry Hindess, A Society Governed by Contract?, in THE NEW CONTRACTUALISM 14, 22
(Glyn Davis et al. eds., 1997).
53 Polanyi termed systemic changes under capitalism "double movement." First, there
is the historical movement of the market, a movement that has no inherent limits and there-
fore threatens society's very existence. In response, the society defends itself by creating
institutions for its protection. Rise of laissez-faire capitalism and the subsequent rise of the
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transitions, the state and the law play a formative role. The ideology of the
"free" market notwithstanding, "the market has been the outcome of a
conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government which
imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends.
'5 4
In order to appreciate the neoliberal transformation of the economy, it is
critical to take account of the preceding Keynesian welfare order.
Born amidst the carnage of the Great Depression, Keynesianism rests on
the premise that "[clapitalism is a flawed system [whose] development[,]
[if] not constrained, [I will lead to periodic deep depressions and the
perpetuation of poverty.""5 The linchpin of Keynesian economic theory
is the underemployment equilibrium thesis and systemic failure of
aggregate demand in capitalist economies.16 Consequently, capitalism can
be stuck periodically, even permanently, in a condition of slow growth,
high unemployment, and excess capacity.5 7 The recognition that "the
normal state of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation"58 produced
welfare state follow this model. POLANYI, supra note 41, at 136. In this progression, neoliberal-
ism can be seen as ascendency of the market at the expense of the society. In a similar vein,
democratic capitalism as a political economry is seen as ouled by, two conflicting principles ot
regimes of resource allocation: "one operating according to marginal productivity, or what is
revealed as merit by a 'free play of market forces', and the other based on social need or en-
titlement, as certified by the collective choices of democratic politics." Wolfgang Streeck, The
Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 7 (201 I). Neoliberalism, in this frame, is
ascendancy of the first principle at the expense of the latter.
54 POLANYI, supra note 41, at 258.
55 Hyman P. Minsky, Hyman P Minsky (i919-1996), in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
DISSENTING ECONOMISTS 411, 416 (Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, eds., 2d ed. zooo).
56 Costas Lapavitsas, Mainstream Economics in the Neoliberal Era, in NEOLIBERALISM: A
CRITICAL READER 32 (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston eds., 2005). Keynes argued
that the traditional "microeconomic" vision, based on the interaction between prices and wag-
es, be replaced by a "macroeconomic" vision based on relations between aggregates, or overall
quantities, with influence from economic policy, such as the money supply, national revenue,
total consumption, and the volume of savings and investment. In sum,
Keynes's basic conclusion can ... be put very directly. Previously it had been held
that the economic system, any capitalist system, found its equilibrium at full em-
ployment. Left to itself, it was thus that it came to rest. ... Keynes showed that
the modern economy could as well find its equilibrium with continuing, serious
underemployment. Its perfectly normal tendency was to what economists have
since come to call an underemployment equilibrium.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, 'IE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY z16 (1977). For details, see JOHN MAY-
NARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 6 (1936) [herein-
after GENERAL THEORY]. For the influence of Keynes on public policies of the era, for example
THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM ACROSS NATIONS (Peter A. Hall ed.,
1989).
57 For detailed analyses, see, for example ALVIN HARVEY HANSEN, FULL RECOVERY OR
STAGNATION? (1938); M. KALECKI, THEORY OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: AN ESSAY ON CYCLICAL
AND LONG-RUN CHANGES IN CAPITALIST ECONOMY (1954) HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES (2008).
58 PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER 108 (1966) (emphasis in original).
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the so-called Keynesian compromise between capital and labor, which
animated national fiscal and counter-cyclical monetary policies calibrated
to promote full employment. With this turn the welfare state was born.59
The chronic aggregate demand problem of capitalism was to be resolved
through full employment, increasing wages with increases in productivity,
and the resulting enhanced purchasing power of the working classes.6°
The Keynesian compromise produced an activist state as a countervailing
power to the market, with the state using regulations and protections to
temper the creative destruction of capitalism.61 Welfare safety nets related
to unemployment, nutrition, health, and retirement provided partial but
significant reprieve from the ever-expanding commodification of life by
capitalism.
Containment of finance capital was a critical component of this
compromise. While Keynes's desire for "euthanasia of the rentier, of the
functionless investor"6 and the policy goal to "driv[e] the usurious money
lenders out of the temple of international finance ' 63 remained elusive,
elaborate national and international regulatory regimes that were set in place
to make finance capital subservient to production and national priorities.'M
59 A good definition of a welfare state is offered by Asa Briggs:
A welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at
least three directions - first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum
income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second by
narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet
certain "social contingencies" (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment)
which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all
6itizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards avail-
able in relation to a certain agreed range of social services.
Asa Briggs, The Welfare State in Historical Perspective, in THE WELFARE STATE READER 16 (Chris-
topher Pearson & Francis Castle eds., 2d ed. 2oo6).
6o See GRAEBER, supra note 3, at 373. The Employment Act of 1946 crystallized the policy
of using power of the federal government "to promote maximum employment, production,
and purchasing power." PERRY MEHRLING, TE NEW LOMBARD STREET: How THE FED BECAME
THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 52-53 (201i).
61 For details, see, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: TYIE CONCEPT
OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 141-57 (1952); PoLANYI, supra note 41.
62 GENERAL ThEORY, supra note 56, at 376. Keynes took the position that "comprehensive
socialisation [sic] of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full
employment." Id. at 378.
63 Henry Morgenthau, Sec'y of the Treasury, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Closing Ad-
dress at the Bretton Woods Conference (July 22, t944), quoted in Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin,
Finance andAmerican Empire, in EMPIRE RELOAbED 50 (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 2004)
(alteration in original).
64 Architects of the new regulatory regimes were mindful of the inter-war havoc in
global finance. BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 43-90 (2d ed. 2oo8); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ThE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENC-
ES OF THE PEACE 226 (1920). For details of the post-World War II international financial order,
see, for example, HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE ES-
SENTIAL GUIDE (2008); ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OFA MONETARY SYSTEM
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The result of this macroeconomic policy framework was a prolonged era of
growth, rising wages, and a linkage between Fordist mass-production and
mass-consumption that is often termed "the golden age" of capitalism.6"
By the early 1970s, the Keynesian welfare system appeared exhausted.
The costs of accelerating demands from below for expanded economic and
social rights, imperial wars, and an escalating balance of payment deficits
created a crisis for wealth-owning classes.66 Rates of profit were falling, and
the share of income of wealth-owning classes shrank.67 Predictions of "the
death of equities"68 accompanied "the worst bond bear market not just in
memory but in history ' 69 and the Bank of International Settlements raised
alarms of "a genuine dollar crisis."7° The "golden age" of prosperity turned
first into a "limping golden age" then into a "leaden age."171 Faced with
declining rates of profit and shrinking shares of wealth, wealth-owning
classes desired a fundamental break with the Keynesian compromise. 72
Breaking the power of the working classes in order to depress wages
was an essential step towards this objective. This is when the neoliberal
counterrevolution was launched. 73
2 (1978); ANTHONY M. ENDRES, GREAT ARCHITECTS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: THE BRETTON
WOODS ERA (2005); Jonathan Kirshner, Keynes, Capital Mobility.and the Crisis of EmbeddedLib-
eralism, 6 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 313 (1999); Tayyab Mahmud, Is It Greek or D&je Vu All Over
Again?: Neoliberalism and Winners andLosers of InternationalDebt Crises, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 629,
654-661 (2011).
65 For a detailed discussion, CHRIS HARMAN, ZOMBIE CAPITALISM: GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE
RELEVANCE OF MARX 161-175 (Haymarket Books 2010) (2009).
66 For a detailed analysis, see GtRARD DUMfNIL & DOMINIQUE LtvY, THE CRISIS OF NEO-
LIBERALISM 7-10 (201 I).
67 ROBERT BRENNER, TH4E BOOM AND THE BUBBLE: THE US IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 19-22
figs.I.I & 1.2, tbls.I.2 & 1.3 (2002); HARMAN, supra note 65, at 196 fig.I; Robert Brenner, The
Long Upturn, 229 NEW LEFT REV., May/June 1998, at 48; Robert Brenner, Uneven Development
and the Long Downturn: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Boom to Stagnation, 195o-t988,
NEW LEFT REV., May/June 1998, at 138.
68 The Death of Equities: How Inflation is Destroying the Stock Market, BUSINESS WEEK, August
13, 1979, at 54.
69 Bill Gross, CEO of PIMCO, the largest international bond fund, quoted in NIALL FER-
GUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD IO8 (2008).
70 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1979)
[hereinafter BIS].
71 JOAN ROBINSON, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 52-54 (1962).
72 For details, see GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS
OF THE RISE OF FINANCE (2011); Susanne MacGregor, The Welfare State and Neoliberalism, in
NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston eds., 2005).
73 See, for example DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 19 (2005) [here-
inafter NEOLtBEALiSMi, fot discussions of the genesis and nature of neolibetalism; S&tIR
AMIN, THE LIBERAL VIRUS: PERMANENT WAR AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE WORLD (James
H. Membrez trans., 2004); JAMIE PECK, CONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL REASON 1-8 (2010);
MICHAEL PERELMAN, RAILROADING ECONOMICS: THE CREATION OF THE FREE MARKET MYTHOL-
OGY (2006); RAYMOND PLANT, THE NEo-LIBERAL STATE (2009); David Miller, How Neoliberalism
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Neoliberalism is a strategy of wealth-owning classes to reverse the
setbacks to their wealth and privilege and to expand their reach globally
under the hegemony of the United States. 74 Neoliberalism did not displace
the state as much as it reformulated it, turning the "nation-state" into a
"market-state."75 Neoliberalism was first road-tested in Chile following
Pinochet's coup d'Atat,7 6 then in NewYork City's 1975 "coup d'itatby financial
institutions against the democratically elected government," 7  and finally
in the United Kingdom by the International Monetary Fund to reverse
the course of Keynesian fiscal policies.7 8 These trial runs established an
enduring principle of neoliberalism: "in the event of a conflict between
the integrity of financial institutions and bondholders on the one hand and
the well-being of the citizens on the other, the former [should be] given
preference. '79 Finally, a decisive financial "coup",8" indeed a "putsch",8
was launched in 1979 by way of the so-called "Volcker shock," which
Paul Volcker, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, characterized as a
"triumph of central banking."' In a radical tightening of monetary policy,
interest rates were raised exponentially ostensibly to break the back
of inflation, the enemy of finance capital. Note that "monetary policy
Got to Where It Is: Elite Planning, Corporate Lobbying and the Release of the Free Market, in THE RISE
AND FALL OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE COLLAPSE OF AN ECONOMIC ORDER? 23 (Kean Birch & Vlad
Mykhnenko eds., 20 10).
74 This is in tune with Max Weber's observation that "naked class situation" tends to
predominate during periods of economic transformation, whereas status-group claims pre-
dominate during periods of economic stability. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUT-
LINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 938 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff
et al. trans., Univ. Calif. Press 1978) (1922).
75 Anthony Carty, Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American (Twenty-
First) Century?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES 170
(Susan Mark ed., 2oo8). In an evocative portrayal, under neoliberalism government has "be-
come business. And nation-states have become holding companies in and for themselves."
Comaroff, supra note 5o , at 145 (emphasis in original).
76 See JuAN GABRIEL VALDtS, PINOCHET's ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN CHILE
(1995), for a detailed account.
77 HARVEY, supra note 73, at 29. See, for example, WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT:
NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN FISCAL CRISIS (1982), for details of how-bankers forced New
York to accept "fiscal discipline" as the cost of a bailout by curbing municipal unions, layoffs in
public employment, wage freezes, cuts in social provisions, and imposition of user fees; Rob-
ert Fitch, Explaining New York City's Aberrant Economy, NEW LEFT REV., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 17.
78 MARK D. HARMON, ThE BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE IMF CRISIS (1997).
79 David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 61o ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
SC. 22, 31 (2007).
80 GgRARD DUMINIL & DOMINIQUE Lvy, CAPITAL RESURGENT: ROOTS OF NEOLIBERAL
REVOLUTION 69, 165 (Derek Jeffers trans., 2004).
81 Streeck,supra note 53, at'12.
82 Paul A. Volcker, The Triumph of Central Banking?, Address for the Per Jacobsson




involves trade-offs between inflation and unemployment. Bond-holders
worry about inflation; workers, about jobs."83 High interest rates induced an
inflow of capital as U.S. government securities became a secure investment
and the dollar became the global currency of choice. Highly liquid U.S.
Treasury bills expanded secondary markets in bonds and allowed the U.S.
to rely on global savings to run up deficits."4 Henceforth, bondholders
were the disciplinarians of U.S. policy makers." The "'Volcker' shock thus
represented a convergence of imperial and domestic responsibilities."86
To be able to institute a hew global capitalist discipline, the U.S. economic
policy-makers had to first, in Volcker's words, "discipline ourselves."87 The
"induced recession" 8 triggered by the Volcker shock was intended to
repress wages and emasculate organized labor by raising unemployment
to unbearable levels.8 9 While the specter of inflation was invoked, what
guided the Federal Reserve was "a baseless fear of full employment."9
The timing of each of the Fed's interest rate hikes substantiates that it
"wanted wages to fall, the faster the better. In crude terms the Fed was
83 JOSEPH E.STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 142 (2OI0); seealso STEPHEN H.AXILROD, INSIDE THE FED: MONETARY POLICY
AND ITS MANAGEMENT, MARTIN TIROUGH GREENSPAN TO BERNANKE 14 (2011) (explaining that
the monetary policy objectives as stated in the Federal Reserve Act require the Federal Re-
serve to "maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates ... so as to promote
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term inter-
est rates"). For key economic objectives and monetary policy indicators between 196o and
201O, see id. at 2o9-1o figs.B.i & B.2.
84 GRAEBER, supra note 3, at 364-369. "To the extent that these Treasury IOUs are being
built into the world's monetary base they will not have to be repaid, but are to be rolled over
indefinitely. This feature is the essence of America's free financial ride, a tax imposed at the
entire globe's expense." MICHAEL HUDSON, SUPER IMPERIALISM: T)lE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE 12 (2d ed. 2003)
85 Op-Ed., The Bond Vigilantes, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2oo9, at AI4.
86 Panitch & Gindin, supra note 63, at 65.
87 PAUL A. VOLCKER & ToYoo GYOHTEN, CHANGING FORTUNES: THE WORLD'S MONEY AND
THE THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 167 (i 9 9 2).
88 Panitch & Gindin, supra note 63, at 63.
89 See Monetary Medicine: Fed's 'Cure' Is Likely to Hurt in Short Run, Most Analysts Believe,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1979, at Ai. Alan Greenspan questioned, "Whether, if unemployment
begins to climb significantly, monetary authorities will have the fortitude to 'stick to the new
policy?" Id.
90 James K. Galbraith, Olivier Giovannoni, & Ann J. Russo, The Fed's Real Reaction Func-
tion:Monetary Policy, Inflation, Unemployment, Inequality--and Presidential Politics I (Levy Econ.
Inst., Working Paper No. 511, 2007), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/lev/wrkpap/wp_51 I.
html; see also Robert J. Barro, Inflation and Growth, REV. OF FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, May-
June 1996, at 153, 159 (arguing that contrary to the anti-inflation posture adopted by the
Federal Reserve, moderate inflation-O to 2o%-has low negative effects on growth, and
that below 1o%, inflation has no effect at all); Michael Sarel, Nonlinear Effects of Inflation on
Economic Growth, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 199 (1996) (explaining that an IMF study found that
below 8% inflation has little impact on growth, and may indeed have a positive impact).
[Vol. ioi
DEBT AND DISCIPLINE
determined to break labor."'" Repeatedly, the Fed raised interest rates
just before major union contract re-negotiations, forcing employers to
squeeze wages.9" In order to establish its credibility with finance capital,
"the Federal Reserve had to demonstrate its willingness to spill blood, lots
of blood, other people's blood."93 Volcker knew that there would be "blood
all over the floor," and "[tihere was blood indeed."94
The "shock therapy" of tight monetary policy, a canonical opening salvo
ofneoliberal structural adjustment,95 paved the road to jettison welfare safety
nets96 and severed the Keynesian linkage between increasing productivity
and increasing worker's wages.97 Sustained assault on wages and workers
ensured that the distribution of gain and pain under neoliberalism would
comply with the objectives of the wealth-owning classes. The downward
trajectory of the rate of profit was reversed and incomes and wealth of
the wealthy increased while those of the rest stagnated and declined. 98
91 WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE
COUNTRY 429 (1987).
92 See Edwin Dickens, The Federal Reserve's Tight Monetary Policy During the t973-75 Re-
cession: A Survey of Possible Interpretations, REV. RADICAL POL. ECON., Sept. I997, at 79, 87; Ed-
win Dickens, The Great Inflation and U.S. Monetary Policy in the Late 196os: A Political Economy
Approach, 9 Soc. CONCEPT 49 (1995).
93 Michael Mussa, U.S. Monetary Policy in the i98os, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN
THE I98OS 81, 112 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994).
94 George Melloan, Op-Ed., Some Reflections on My32 Years with Bartley, WALL ST. J., Dec.
16, 2003.
95 See Ben Fine & Dimitris Milonakis, 'Useless But True': Economic Crisis and the Peculiari-
ties of Economsic Science, HIST. MATERIALISM, June 1, 2011, at 6 (arguing that neoliberal reorder-
ing falls "roughly into two phases - the first as the shock-therapy associated with Reagan
and Thatcher, Latin America, and the Soviet bloc, and the second with the social market,
Third-Wayism and the post-Washington consensus."). For uses of shocks, both natural and
man-made, to promote neoliberal restructuring, see NAOMI KLEIN,I)HE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE
RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 7 (2007).
96 See Greg Albo & Bryan Evans, From Rescue Strategies to Exit Strategies: The Struggle
Over Public Sector Austerity, in TYIE CRISIS THIs TIME 283 (Leo Panitch et al. eds., 201o); Lisa
Philipps, Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2ooo, at I I I.
97 See GRAEBER, SrUpra note 3, at 375, for the relationship between productivity and wag-
es between 1947 and 2004.
98 See DUMtNIL & LeW, supra note 66, at 58-59 fig.4.I (explaining that the rate of profit,
which was 7.8% in 1952-1971, and fell to 6.4% during the 1970S, rose to 8.3% between 1995-
2005); id. at 46 fig.3. I (explaining that the share of total income received by the top 1% of the
income bracket rose from 9% in 1980 to 23% in 2007); id. at 51-5z fig.3.5 (explaining that the
share of the top 5% of the total of wages and capital income rose from 15.5% during 1952-
1971 to 25.8% during 1990-2009); LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA,
2008/2009 125 tbl.3.I (2009) (explaining that the median overall compensation, wages plus
benefits, rose at a rate ofo.2% during 1983-9, 0.1% per year between 1992-2ooo, and did not
grow at all during 2002-07). For share of total income of the top 1%, 1913 - 2007, see ROBERT
B. REICH, AFTERSHOCK: THE NEXT ECONOMY AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 20 fig. I (201o); Robert B.
Reich, The Limping Middle Class, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 4, 201 i, at SR6; see also DUMtNIL & LvY, su-
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Concurrently, neoliberalism scored "a critical victory" by "[cihanging
public expectations about citizenship entitlements, the collective provision
of social needs, and the efficacy of the welfare state." 99
Along with the assault on wages and workers through tight monetary
policy, the power of organized labor was crushed by direct coercion. This was
inaugurated by the smashing of the Air Traffic Controllers' strike-in 1981 by
President Reagan.l °° Paul Volcker characterized this as "the most important
single action of the administration in helping the anti-inflation fight," ' and
Alan Greenspan designated it "a paradigm shift" and a "political turning
point."1' In its demonstration effect on corporate behavior, this state action
"recast the crimes of union busting as acts of patriotism."" It triggered "a
pra note 66, at 49-50 fig.3.3 (explaining that between I98O and 2009, the share in total income
of the bottom 95% wage earners fell from 62.z% to 51.5%); EDWARD N. WOLFF, Top HEAVY 7
(1996); David McNally, From Financial Crisis to World-Slump: Accumulation, Finanialisation,
andthe Global Crisis, HisT. MATERIALISM, June 1, 2009, at 35,60 (explaining that incomes of the
bottom 90% fell by 9%, while incomes for the top I% increased by ioi %, and those of the top
o.I% rose 227%); Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, zo1, at Ai, A21 (stating that in 2010, 15.1% Americans, 46.2 million, were living
below the poverty line; the highest level since 1993. The rate for Blacks is 27%, Hispanics
26%, Asians 12.1%, and Whites 9.9%). For a study of global rise of top incomes during the
neoliberal era, see Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the
Long Run of History 1-68 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 154o8, 2009),
available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/atkinson-piketty-saezNB ERo9topincomes.pdf.
99 Janine Brodie, Restructuring and the New Citizenship, in RETHINKING RESTRUCTURING:
GENDER AND CHANGE IN CANADA 126, 131 (Isabella Bakker ed., 1996). For neoliberal approach-
es towards constitutionalism, see David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatiza-
tion: An Inquiry into the Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Au-
tumn 2ooo, at 83, 85-86. For detailed analyses of the transformations in the welfare systems,
see PETRICIA MARCHAK, THE INTEGRATED CIRCUS: THE NEW RIGHT AND THE RESTRUCTURING
OF GLOBAL MARKETS 258-59 (1993); BRENOAN MARTIN, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST? PRIVATIZA-
TION AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM (1993); GARY TEEPLE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF
SOCIAL REFORM 41-49 (2000); Macgregor, supra note 72, at 142-43; Herman Schwartz, Round
Up the Usual Suspects!: Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Welfare State Change, in THE NEW
POLITICS OFTHE WELFARE STATE (Paul Pierson ed., 2001). For details of how neoliberalism rose
in the midst of a conservative resurgence in U.S. politics aimed against the activist Keynes-
ian welfare state, see Mark A. Smith, Economic Insecurity, Party Reputations, and the Republican
Ascendance, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE
RISE OF CONSERVATISM 135 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007). For an exploration
of the relationship between neoliberalism, debt imperialism and evangelical Christianity, see
MELINDA COOPER, LIFE AS SURPLUS: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CAPITALISM IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA
160-68 (2008).
io See JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, 'ME AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED AMERICA 24 (2011); Joseph A. McCartin, The
Strike That Busted Unions, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011 , at A2 5 .
1o John B. Taylo, Changes in American Economic Policy in the 198os: Watershed or Pendulum
Swing?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 777, 778 (I995) (quoting Paul Volcker).
102 DAVID M. SMICK, THE WORLD IS CURVED: HIDDEN DANGERS TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
220-21 (2OO8) (quoting Alan Greenspan).
103 MARTIN JAY LEVITT WITH TERRY CANROW, CONFESSIONS OFA UNION BUSTER 217 (1993).
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capitalist offensive that involved both political mobilization and relentless
hostility to unions."'1 4 Henceforth, investment and relocation decisions
were guided by an informal rule that "no plant which is unionized will
be expanded onsite."' 15 As neoliberal ideology of market fundamentalism
took hold, unions weakened. 1°6 Even labor leaders acknowledged that
unions were "sliding towards irrelevance and oblivion,"'' 7 and were on the
road to a complete collapse. 108
Another prong of the neoliberal attack on wages and workers was
to mobilize global labor surpluses through offshoring. 1°9 As neoliberal
globalization, a "disciplinary force over the powers of labor,"" l0 unfolded,
union power weakened further."' Liberalization of international trade and
capital movements induced investments to flow to regions where prevailing
political and social conditions allowed higher returns on investments.1
2
104 Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What has Happened to the US Labor Movement?
Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 95, 1oo-o (1999).
105 THOMAS A KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
263 (1986).
io6 See id.; see also William B. Gould IV, Op-Ed., Crippling the Right to Organize, N.Y
TIMES, Dec. 17, 201 1, at A25 (explaining that the primary federal labor relations oversight
body, the National Labor Relations Board, was increasingly rendered dysfunctional after the
neoliberal turn)..
107 STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN WORKER
243 (2008).
1o8 See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHING-
TON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 56-57 (2010).
o9 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis This Time, in BUSINESS As USUAL:
THE ROOTS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 89,98 (Craig Calhoun & Georgi Derluguian
eds., 2011).
IIo Id . at96.
I I I For detailed accounts, see Clawson & Clawson, supra note 104, at IoT; see also ROB-
ERT J. FLANAGAN, GLOBALIZATION AND LABOR CONDITIONS: WORKING CONDITIONS AND WORKER
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (zoo6) (explaining how globalization alters labor conditions);
ROBERT A. SENSER, JUSTICE AT WORK: GLOBALIZATION AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WORKERS
(2009) (concluding that 21st century globalization needs to protect the rights of workers and
worker organizations, such as unions); BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS' MOVE-
MENTS AND GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870 13-25 (2003) (explaining how mobilization of global-
ization has undermined existing labor unions); Michael Spence, The Impact of Globalization
on Income and Employment: The Downside of Integrating Markets, 90 FOREIGN AFF., 2011 , at 28,
29 (explaining how internationalization negatively affects the job market and labor unions).
1 12 Flows of corporate profits from the rest of the world generated by U.S. direct foreign
investments as a percentage of GDP, rose from 1.4% to z.o% during the 199os, and reached
3.8% in 2008. DUM9NIL & LIvV, supra note 66, at I I6. Until 198o, flows of annual direct foreign
investment fluctuated around 0.5% of Gross World Product (GWP); by 2007, it accounted for
3.9%. Id. at 114-15. By 2007, the outstanding stock of worldwide direct foreign investment
reached 29% of GWP and accounted for 25% of global stock market capitalization. Id. at I 15.A
defining feature of neoliberal globalization is dramatic expansion of international trade. Prior
to the first oil shock of the early 1970s, foreign trade amounted to about io% of GWP; by 2008,
it accounted for 26.s%. Id. at 113-14.
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Wage pressure from countries with low labor costs was transmitted to
the United States. Fragmentation and global dispersal of labor markets
necessitated that workers compete against one another across national
boundaries.1 1 3 Labor movements weakened in areas of capital emigration
and strengthened in areas of capital in-migration.114 Capital's unbridled
mobility impeded states' ability to manage national economies, and with
workers in different parts of the world in direct competition, labor's efforts
at international solidarity fragmented."' 5 The global labor market erased
territorial boundaries for the highly skilled while reinforcing borders for
the unskilled." 6 All this combined to add downward wage pressure on
vulnerable jobs and, indirectly, throughout the economy.
The combined effect of these developments on organized labor was
devastating. Both union membership and union efficacy sank to historic
lows. 1'7 Given the nature and size of union wage premium, wages were
113 KIM MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM 112-26 (1988);
Clawson & Clawson,supra note 104, at 1O.
114 There was a sharp drop in labor unrest in core capitalist countries, a slight rise in
the semiperiphery, and a sharp rise "in the periphery. Beverly 1. Silver, World-Scale Patterns
of Labor-Capital Conflict: Labor Unrest, Long Waves, and Cycles of World Hegemony, 18 FERNAND
BRAUDEL CENTER REV. 155, 172-83 (1995).
115 See KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECON-
OMY 117-40 (1997), for detailed accounts; Frank Borgers, The Challenges of Economic Global-
ization for U.S. Labor, 22 CRITICAL Soc. 67, 78-85 (1996); Terry Boswell & Dimitris Stevis,
Globalization and International Labor Organizing: A World-System Perspective, 24 WORK OCCUP.
z88, 289-92 (1997); Charles Tilly, Globalization Threatens Labor's Rights, 47 INT'L. LAB. WORK-
ING-CLASs HIST., Spring 1995, at 1, 16-18.
116 By 2007, 6.5% of U.S. jobs were deemed highly offshorable and another i5.1% off-
shorable, translating into about 31.6 million jobs. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 98, at 194-95
tbl.3 .29. Note that occupations vulnerable to offshoring require more education and pay more
than other occupations. The offshorable wage premium is io.8%, and among jobs requiring
at least a college degree the offshorable premium is 13.9%. Id. The United Nations has ob-
served, "The global labour market is increasingly integrated for the highly skilled - corporate
executives, scientists, entertainers, and the many others who form the global professional elite
- with high mobility and wages. But the market for unskilled labour is highly restricted by na-
tional barriers." UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999 3 (1999).
Immigration added to the complexity of the labor markets. in the U.S., in 1970, the share of
immigrants in the workforce stood at 5.2%, steadily increasing to 15.8% in 2007. MISHEL ET
AL., supra note 98, at 197, tbl.3.3o. The increase in the available labor supply coupled with the
fact that 29. 1% of immigrants as opposed to 6. 1% of native-born workers have less than a high
school education, and 11.1% as opposed to 9.1% are with advanced degrees, puts downwards
pressure on wages particularly in both unskilled and unskilled sectors. Id. at 168, tbl.3.18.
117 In 2010, 11.9% of workers belonged to a union; in 1983 this figure was 20. 1%. News
Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members 2011 (Jan. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. In the private sector, union
membership rate fell from z5% in 1975 to 6.9% in 2010, the lowest level since I9OI. Id. See
STEVEN GREENHOUSE, TIIE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN WORKER 243 (2oo8).
While between 1969 and 1979, strikes involved around 950,000 workers every year, the num-
ber of strikes dropped to less than halfa million workers every year between 1987 and 1996.
Clawson & Clawson, supra note 104, at 97. The number of work stoppages moved from 3517
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directly impacted by the decline of unions.11 s Those in lower-paid jobs
and racial minorities were hit particularly hard."19 Decline in the value
of the legally mandated minimum wage added to the burdens of the
most vulnerable sections of the working classes. 2 0 Anemic growth, high
systemic unemployment, and a decrease in the rate of investment despite
a rise in profits-all enduring features of the neoliberal era--exerted
added pressure on the working classes.' 2 ' The Keynesian era linkage of
productivity growth with wage growth went by the wayside, resulting in
in 195o-6o, to 2829 in 1960-70, to 2888 in 197o-8o, to 831 in I98O-9O, to 347 in 1990-2000,
to 201 in 2000-lo, and to I I since 201O. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Work stoppages involving I,OOO or more workers, 1947-20 lo tbl.I (Feb. 8, 2012),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.toi.htm.
I 18 In 2007, the union wage premium was 14. 1 %; 17. 1% for men, and 10.7% for women.
MISHEL ET AL., supra note 98, at 201, tbl.3.3 2. Unionized workers are 28.2% more likely to be
covered by employer-provided health insurance, and 24.4% more likely to receive health
insurance coverage in their retirement. Id. at 202, tbl.3.33. Between 1979 and 2006, the em-
ployers' contribution to retirement benefits declined, and workers are less likely to have an
employer-sponsored pension in zoo6 compared with 1979. Id. at 150, tbl.3.13. In 1979, the
number of those without any health coverage was 27 million, or about 15% of the nonelderly
population; in 2oo6, the corresponding numbers were over 46 million and almost 18%. Kath-
erine Swartz, Uninsured in America: New Realities, New Risks, in HEALTH AT RISK: AMERICA'S
AILING HEALTH SYSTEM -AND HOW TO HEAL IT 32 , 59 (Jacob S. Hacker, ed., 2oo8). For the
relationship between income inequality and the decline of unions, see Zaid Jilani, How Income
Inequality Skyrocketed and the i Percent Profited From the Decline of Unions, THINK PROGRESS (Oct.
21, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/speciallzoi 1/1021/350012/income-inequality-
decline-of-unions/.
19 The union wage premium along racial groups is 17.4% for Asians, 18.3% for Blacks,
21.9% for Hispanics, and 12.4% for Whites. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 98, at 2O1, tbl.3.32. The
union wage premium is even larger for those with low wages, in lower-paid occupations, and
with less education. Id. at 207, tbl.3.36.
12o There was a 29.9% decline in minimum wage's value between 1979 and t989. Even
after subsequent legislated raises, in 2009, it was 6.8% less than its peak value in the late
I96OS. Id. at 2o8-211 , figs.3AA & fig.3AB, tbl.3.38. The ratio of minimum wage to what an
average worker earned per hour has also consistently declined since the late I96os. This ratio
was 50% in the late I96Os, 45% in mid-197Os, 40% in early 199os, and 34% in 2007. Id. at 209.
Entry-level wages for male high school graduates, adjusted for inflation, have fallen 23% since
1973. Paul Krugman, 0Op-Ed., Money andMorals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. IO, 2012, atA27.
121 Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.9% in the 1940s
, 
4.2% in the 195os and
I96Os, 3.4% in the 1970s, 3.2% in the I98Os and 199os, and 1.9% in the 2000s. Magdoff, supra
note 12, at 30. During the 1950s and 196os, for about 40% of the time, the unemployment rate
was below 4%; from the 1970s through zoto, unemployment was less than 4% for less than
1% of the time, and higher than 6% over half the time. Id. Since the early 198os, the trend has
been a generalized decrease in wages and a decrease of the rate of accumulation despite a rise
in profit rates. Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capitalism, in CRssIS IN TilE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: FINANCIAL MARKETS, SOCIAL STRUGGLES, AND NEW POLITICAL SCENARIOS 17 (Andrea
Fumagalli & Sandro Mezzadra eds., Jason Francis Me Gimsey trans., 201 o). The stock of fixed
capital in the U.S. economy is 32 percent lower than it would have been if investment rates of
the pre-I98O era were maintained. DUMtNIL & Ltv, supra note 66, at 61-63.
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
further wage--compression and inequality."' 2 Workers, in particular married
women with children, were constrained to work longer hours."2 3 In the end,
the average household worked more hours for lesser wages" 4 and retiring
at age 65 became an increasingly elusive goal."' s
Structural changes in the organization of capital added to the woes of the
working classes. The paradigm of shareholder value maximization became
the "zeitgeist" of corporate governance.12 6 The emphasis on shareholder
122 Between 2ooo and 2007, while GDP grew 18% and productivity grew 19%, median
income of working-age households fell 3.4%, poverty rate increased by I.I%, and inequality
increased by 1.4%. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 98, at 19 tbl. I. For a comparison of productivity
and hourly compensation growth average and medians for females and males between 1973
and 2007 , see id. at 161 fig.30. For hourly wage growth by gender, and race/ethnicity between
I989-2007, see id. at 177 tbl.3.22. For inter-gender wage ratio between 1973 and 2007, see
id. at 178 tbl.z.23. For the relationship between growth of average hourly compensation and
productivity, 1947-2oo8, see REICH, supra note 98, at 52 fig.2. For the post-197OS rise of in-
equality, see KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: DOWNWARD MOBILITY IN THE AGE
OF AFFLUENCE (1999).
123 Over this period, the average person earns less per hour worked. BONNER & WIG-
GIN, supra note 8, at 203. Average yearly hours worked for all workers increased from 1703
in 1979 to 1883 in 2oo6. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 98, at 128 tbl.3.z. Average weekly hours
spent in the paid labor market for all workers went from 38.7 in 1975 to 39.2 in 2006, annual
hours worked for married couples increased by about 25%, and that of middle-income mar-
ried women doubled. Id. at 9o fig. iW The increase of working hours for married women with
children belonging to different income groups increased 31.9 to 6o.7% between 1979 and
2ooo, a change that had a decisive impact on the real income growth of married couples with
children among the lower three-fifths of the income groups. Id. at 92-93 tbls.1.21 & 1.22.
Between I989 and 2ooo, annual working hours for the bottom fifth of wage earners increased'
by 7.3%, while those for the top fifth decreased by 0.5%. Id. Americans "work longer hours
than the citizens of any other country that has a per capita income of more than $3o,ooo at
market exchange rate in 2007." HA-JooN CHANG, 23 T IINGS THEY DON'T TELL You ABOUT
CAPITALISM I09 (2o10); see also Thorvaldur Gylfason, Why Europe Works Less, and Grows Taller,
50 CHALLENGE I (Jan./Feb. 2007).
124 Between I999 and 2009, median household income fell 7%. For those in the bottom
io% of the income spectrum, the fall was 12%. Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty RateSoars to Highest
LevelSince 1993, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, at At, A2I. Between 1979 and 2007, the share of
after-tax income of the top I% of the population climbed from 8 to 17%, while that of the,
middle three-fifth of the population declined by 2 to 3%. Robert Pear, It's Official: The Rich Get
Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at A2o. The share of total income of the top I%t rose from
8% in 1979 to 24% in 2007, a level last seen in 1928. Sam Roberts, As the Data Show, There's a
Reason the Protesters Chose New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at A23.
125 In March 2012, I8% of Americans 65 and older are in the labor force, up from 13% a
decade ago. Steven Greenhouse, After the Storm: Rescuing the Little Nest Egg That Couldn't, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at Fi. The proportion of Americans over 65 in the labor force increased
from Io.8% in 1985 to I2.I% in 1995 to 15.1% in 2005 to 17.4% in 20o0. Another 450,000
Americans 65 and older are unemployed and looking for work. Edward P. Glaeser, Goodbye,
Golden Years, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 20, 2o I, at SRI.
126 CHANG, supra note 123, at 17. For detailed analyses, see MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE
REBIRIOUX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT: A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2005); CO-
LIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 103-109 (2O1 I); Paddy Ireland,
Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards a Less Degenerate Capitalism?, 23
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value necessitated squeezing out other stakeholders; job cuts, lower wages,
and fewer benefits were a natural corollary."2 7 Besides reducing the wage
bill, capital expenditures were reduced by cutting back investment.1"'
Capital accumulation was sacrificed in favor of income distribution
benefitting the upper classes.I2 9 As dividends and stock buybacks increased,
reinvestment decreased, with a negative impact on productive capacity
and employment.130 Furthermore, increased debt levels of corporations
unavoidably tended to "discipline the employment relationship" as firms
with higher debt reduced their employment more often, used more part
time and seasonal employees, paid lower wages, and funded pension plans
less generously. 3'
J.L. & Soc'Y 287 (1996); William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A
New Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & Soc'Y 13 (2000). Jack Welch, credited with
coining the phrase "shareholder value," now calls it the "dumbest idea in the world." CHANG,
supra note 123, at 17, 22.
127 Floyd Norris, For Business, Golden Days; For Workers, The Dross, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
2011 , at B3.
128 CHANG, supra note 123, at 19.
129 For comparison of profits and net investment as a percentage of GDP between 196o
and 2005, see JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER & FRED MAGDOFF, THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 133, chart 6.5 (oo9). The share of after-tax profits paid out as dividends
rose from 51% in the 196os and 197os, to 74% in the 198os and 199os, and peaked above
ioo% after 2ooo. DUMtNIL & Ltvy, supra note 66, at 62 fig.4.3, 355 n.8. Note that the richest
I% in the United States holds USD 1.9 trillion in stock, about equal to that of the other 99%.
Edward N. Wolff, Changes in Household Wealth in the i98os and 199os in the U.S. 3 1, tbl.3 (Levy
Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 407, May 2004), available at http://www.levyin-
stitute.org/pubs/wp4o7.pdf. Share buy-backs that were less than 5% of U.S. corporate profits
until the early 198os, reached 90% in 2007 and 280% in 2008. CHANG, supra note 123, at 19-20;
Lazonick & O'Sullivan, supra note 126, at 24; William Lazonick, The Buyback Boondoggle, Bus.
WK., Aug. 24, 2009, at 96.
13o For comparison of profits and net investment as a percentage of GDP between I96o
and 2005, see FOSTER & MAGDOFF, supra note 129, at 133, chart 6. 5 . Investment as a share of
U.S. national output declined from 20.5% in the I98Os to 18.7% during 1990-2009. CHANG,
supra note 123, at 19. For five-year moving average of net-private non-residential fixed in-
vestments as a percentage of GDP between 196o and 2005, see FOSTER & MAGDOFF, supra
note 129, at 103, chart 5.2. For percent utilization of industrial capacity between 1965 and
2005, see id. at 132, chart 6.4. It was noted that "the withering away of net investment spells
approaching termination of the historical and deeply rooted raison d'etre of the non-financial
firm: accumulation of capital." HAROLD G. VAITER & JOHN E WALKER, THE INEVITABILITY OF
GOVERNMENT GROWTH 7 (1990).
131 Gordon Hanka, Debt and the Terms of Employment, 48 1. OF FIN. ECON. 245, 245 (1998).
For companies shortchanging employees with regards to pension plans, see ELLEN E. SCHULTZ,
RETIREMENT HEIST: How COMPANIES PLUNDER AND PROFIT FROM THE NEST EGGS OF AMERICAN
WORKERS 9-28 (2011). For increased influence of credit-rating agencies over corporations,
see TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES
AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS (2OO5). The increased delegation of disciplining to
non-majoritarian institution like rating agencies formed part of a shift towards "privatization
of public policy." For details, see David Cohen & Wyn Grant, Managing Business and Govern-
mentRelations, in BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT: METHODS AND PRACTICE 13,14 (David Cohen &
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Financialization, another defining feature of the neoliberal era,
engendered "a prolonged split between the divergent real and financial
economies."' 32 Whereas up until the 1970s "the old structure of the
economy[] consist[ed] of a production system served by modest financial
adjuncts," with the neoliberal turn this gave way to "a new structure in
which a greatly expanded financial sector had achieved a high degree of
independence and sat on top of the underlying production system."'33
Far beyond its classic role of credit provision, finance was now positioned
"directly at the heart of the accumulation process, essentially introducing
a new sector that straddled credit and production."'3 4 The result was
"exhaustion of the progressive force of capital" and reinforcement of its
"increasingly parasitical character."'3 s The pursuit of neoliberal class
objectives- resulted in a "divorce" between the upper classes and the
United States domestic economy.'36
In sum, the radical use of monetary policy to attack wages and smash
the power of organized labor inaugurated the neoliberal era. This was
complemented by coercion of unions, globalization, focus on shareholder
value, and a divorce between finance and the productive economy. These
systemic changes decisively transformed the grounds of aggregate demand
from full employment to consumer debt. Two mechanisms combined to
create the requisite domestic demand: (1) increased consumption by wealth
owning classes whose incomes now saw a steady rise, and (2) increased
indebtedness of the working classes.'37 Financialization of the economy,
facilitated by public laws and policies, operationalized this historic shift.
III. FINANCIALIZATION, REVERSE RED-LINING,
AND PRIVATE DEFICIT SPENDING
Wyn Grant eds., 2006); Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to
Non-Majoritarian Institutions, z 5 W. EUR. POL., Jan. 2002, at I.
132 KEVIN PHILLIPS, ARROGANT CAPITAL: WASHINGTON, WALL STREET, AND THE FRUSTRA-
TION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 82 (1994) (emphasis in original). The divergence between profits
and accumulation is a primary indication of financialization. See Marazzi, supra note 12 1, at z8.
133 Paul M. Sweezy, Economic Reminiscences, 47 MONTHLY REV. 8, 9 (May 1995).
134 Panitch & Gindin, supra note 63, at 68.
135 Carlo Vercellone, The Crisis of the Law of Value and the Becoming-Rent of Profit, in CRISIS
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: FINANCIAL MARKETS, SOCIAL STRUGGLES, AND NEW POLITICAL SCE-
NARIOS 86, 90 (Andrea Fumagalli & Sandro Mezzadra eds., Jason Francis Mc Gimsey trans.,
zoio). The progressive force of capital refers to its active role in the organization of labor and
development of productive forces as a means of struggle against scarcity and enabling the
passage from necessity to liberty. Id. at 92. Parasitical character comes forth in intensification
of accumulation by dispossession and increased appropriations of the commons. Id. at 94-95.
136 DUM9NIL & Lgvy, supra note 66, at 27.
137 Id. at 37-38. Critical political economists recognized "the increase in the reliance on
debt by U.S. households as a means of maintaining their living standard as their wages start-
ed to stagnate or fall." Robert Pollin, The Man Who Explained the Empire: Remembering Harry
Magdoff, COUNTERPUNCH, Jan. 6, 2006, http://www.counterpunch.org/pollinoio62oo6.html.
. [Vol. 1I
DEBT AND DISCIPLINE
Financialization refers to a marked increase in the volume, velocity,
complexity and connectedness of financial flows and an increasing shift
of finance capital from production and trade toward speculation and
intermediation. 3 In the U.S., financialization entailed both the exponential
expansion of financial institutions and instruments to accommodate
corresponding masses of assets and debt and the hegemony of the
corporate managerial criteria of the primacy of value for the shareholders. a9
These developments furnished the prerequisites for the dramatic growth
of household debt and the connection between debt and discipline. Public
law and state policy played a foundational role in this transformation. I14
Neoliberalism's turn to financialization as a systemic response to
the crisis of profitability is in tune with historical cycles of capitalism.' 4'
However, in a departure from historical precedence, financialization of
the U.S. economy served added objectives through innovative means. It
increased both the reach and the depth of the credit economy whereby
debt became the primary catalyst for aggregate demand. Securitization
of debt was a considered public policy aimed to help boost demand and
liquidity for financial markets. As early as the 1980s, Alan Greenspan, the
138 Beverly J. Silver & Giovanni Arrighi, The End of the Long Twentieth Century, in Busi-
NESS As USUAL: TIE ROOTS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 53, 66 (Craig Calhoun &
Georgi Derluguian eds. 201 i); Immanuel Wallerstein, Dynamics of (Unresolved) Global Cnsis, in
BUSINESS As USUAL, 69, 78 (Craig Calhoun & Georgi Derluguian eds. 20uii). Financialization
also entails a "set of transformations through which relations between capitals and between capital
and wage-labour have been increasingly financialised - that is, increasingly embedded in inter-
est-paying financial transactions." McNally, supra note 98, at 56.
139 R. HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL: A STUDY OF THE LATEST PHASE OF CAPITALIST DE-
VELOPMENT (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981) (11o), quoted in DUMI9NIL & Lvyi, su-
pra note 66, at 35; see Craig Calhoun & Georgi Derluguian, Introduction to BUSINESS As USUAL,
supra note I09,at47. See KRIPPNER,supra note 72, fora detailed studyof the political context
of the turn to financialization.
14o The state is "necessarily present in the financial markets." MASsIMO AMATO & LUCA
FANTACCI, IYE END OF FINANCE 46 (English ed. 2012). There are two essentially public func-
tions without which financial markets cannot function: setting up a legal framework within
which contracts are performed and to define what will serve as a unit of account and as an
instrument of payment. Furthermore, the state is the lender of last resort for financial institu-
tions. Id.
141 The pattern of capital shifting into finance and away from trade and production un-
folded in Genoa in the early seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic in the late eighteenth
century, and in Britain in the early twentieth century. Silver & Arrighi, supra note 138, at 55.
For a detailed explanation of this phenomenon, see GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, ADAM SMITH IN BEI-
JING: LINEAGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 85-86 (2007). Perceptive economists argued as
early as the mid-I97os that "the over extension of debt and the overreach of the banks was
exactly what was needed to protect the capitalist system and its profits; to overcome, at least
temporarily, its contradictions." HARY MAGDOFF & PAUL M. SWEEZY, ThE END OF PROSPERITY:
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE 1970S 35 (1977); see also HARRY MAGDOFF & PAUL M. SWEEZY,
STAGNATION AND THE FINANCIAL EXPLOSION 149 (1987); Harry Magdoff & Paul M. Sweezy,
Production and Finance, 35 MONTHLY REV. II (May 1983).
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"maestro" of neoliberal financialization, 14 1 articulated a primary objective
of American foreign economic policy: "diversifying international securities
portfolios . . .disproportionately in dollars."' 143 Securitizing debt and
channeling it into global financial markets enabled syphoning of global
savings to sustain fiscal and trade deficits of the U.S.
The interconnected shift towards financialization and globalization
linked the dramatic growth of household debt with access to global
liquidity.1" It facilitated Americanization of global finance, helped to
entrench the imperial role of the U.S. into global finance, and made it
possible for global savings to flow to the U.S. at an unprecedented scale. 141
The global capital flows now resembled a game of marbles in which, after
each round, "the winners return their marbles to the losers."' 146 These
capital flows secured by a deficit-ridden military power functioned as
"an imperial tithe,"'147 and enabled the U.S. to become "the superpower
142 See BOB WOODWARD, MAESTRO: GREENSPAN'S FED AND THE AMERICAN BooM (2001).
143 LEONARD SEABROOKE, US POWER IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: THE VICTORY OF Divi-
DENDS ISO (2001) (alteration in original).
144 DUM9NIL & Ltvy, supra note 66, at 24. This interconnection is evidenced by expo-
nential rise is the amount of foreign assets held by banks around the world. These assets
amounted to 9% of GWP at the end of 1977 and rose to 59% in 2008. Id. at i s8. Another evi-
dence of this interconnection is the nearly five-fold rise in the daily global turnover of foreign
exchange markets for USD 590 billion in 1989 to USD 3.2 IO billion in 2007. Id. at 124 tbl.8.3.
For the whole U.S. economy, profits from investments abroad represented about 6% of total
business profits in the I96Os, 1 I% in the 1970s, 15 to 16% in the I98os and I99os, and averaged
18% for the five year period 2000-04. FOSTER & MAGDOFF, supra note 129, at 41.
145 MARTIN WOLF, FIXING GLOBAL FINANCE 78 fig.4-14 (2008). For the current account
balance between the industrialized North and the rest of the world, see Silver & Arrighi, supra
note 138, at 64 fig.l.2.
146 RICHARD DUNCAN, TE DOLLAR CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CURES 43 (2003)
(quoting French economist Jacques Rueff).
147 Panitch & Gindin, Finance and American Empire, supra note 63, at 69 (emphasis add-
ed). In the 199os, the Clinton administration put direct pressure on governments around the
world to open their markets for goods, capital and services, and instructed the IMF to pursue
this strategy in the strictest possible terms. Nicholas Kristoff & David E. Sanger, How US
WooedAsia to let Cash Flow in, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at Ai. The United States removed its
capital controls in 1974, the United Kingdom in 1979, Australia and New Zealand in 1984-85,
and Japan during the 1980s. ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF INTERNATION-
AL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 199Us 8-9 (1994). In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty es-
tablished free mobility of capital within the European Union with the rest of the world. Under
Article 73c of the treaty, unanimity is required to restrict mobility towards countries outside
the Union. DUMfNIL & LtvY, supra note 66, at 132, 359 n.2. Seeking "global cooperation," Ben
Bernanke sought Japan's help to hold down U.S. interest rates. BONNER AND WIGGIN, supra
note 8, at 224. In response, Japanese monetary authorities in 2003-04, injected 35 trillion yen
to support the dollar that kept the U.S. long bond yields down to historical low levels. "By
creating and lending the equivalent of $32o billion to the United States, the bank of Japan and
the Japanese Ministry of Finance contracted a private sector run on the dollar and, at the same
time, financed the U.S. tax cuts that reflated the global economy .. " Richard Duncan, How
Japan Financed Global Reflation, FIN. ASIA, Feb. 2005, at 35. For details, see RICHARD DUNCAN,
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of borrowing," 148 making the current account a "meaningless concept"
for U.S. policy makers. 149 The escalating U.S. current account deficit and
debt-driven consumer spending allowed the U.S. economy to function as
"the 'Keynesian engine' of the global economy." 5 ' Financialization, then,
is a kind of "paradoxical financial Keynesianism" whereby demand was
stimulated by asset-bubbles, and these bubbles together with the reserve
currency status of the USD made the U.S. "catalyst of world effective
demand."151
Again, the financialized economy turned debt, rather than full
employment, into the propellant of aggregate demand. Here was
"privatized Keynesianism" in action; instead of governments taking on
debt to stimulate the economy, individuals and families, including the poor,
did so.15 Stagnating and declining wages triggered a marked decline in
savings. 53 However, even in the face of stagnating wages and declining
savings, the boom of consumption during the neoliberal era was "without
precedent,"1 14 making the U.S. consumer "by far the most important
consumer in the world."15 As shrinking wages were insufficient to generate
THE DOLLAR CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CURES I35-37 (2003) (discussing the history of
Japan's monetary policy).
148 WOLF, supra note 145, at 4.
149 The O'NeillDoctrine, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2002, at 12 (quoting Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill). This refers to the unique exemption the U.S. enjoys on account of its global he-
gemony from the general requirement for states to balance their external trade and current
accounts. DUMKNIL AND Lvy, supra note 66, at 24. Outstanding U.S. Treasury securities held
by the rest of the world increased from 17% of the total GDP in 198o to 51% in 2008. U.S.
corporate bonds outstanding held by the rest of the world increased from 4% in 198o to 29% in
2008. Id. at 116 fig.8.4; see also GODFREY HODGSON, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: AMERICA FROM
NIXON TO THE NEW CENTURY (2004) (discussing the economic history of the United States
from the era of President Nixon until 2003).
i 50 McNally, supra note 98, at 63.
151 Riccardo Belloriore & Joseph Halevi, A Minsky Moment?: The Subprime Crisis and
"New" Capitalism, in CREDIT, MONEY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY: A POsT-KEYNESIAN AP-
PROACH 29 (Claude Gnos & Louis-Philippe Rochon eds., 2011).
152 CROUCH, supra note 126, at 114 (2011 ); Colin Crouch, PrivatisedKeynesianism:An Un-
acknowledgedPolicy Regime, II BRIT. J. OF POL. AND INT'L REL. 382,390-91 (2009); Colin Crouch,
What Will Follow the Demise of Privatized Keynesianism?, 79 POL. Q. 476 (2008).
153 While between 1965 and 198o savings amounted to 9.3% of disposable income, by
2005, savings declined to 1.2% (-3.7% if residential investment is treated as consumption).
DUMKNIL & LIvy, supra note 66, at 147 fig. 1o.3.
154 Id. at 146. Consumption in the period 1952-198o, as a percentage of GDP remained
about constant at around 62%, then rose steadily to a plateau of about 70% since 2001. Id. at
147 fig. 1O.3.
t55 Stephen Roach, US Not Certain of Avoiding Japan-Style 'Lost Decade,' FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2oo9, http://www.ft.coin/intl/cms/s/o/b2e558f4-eidb-iidd-afao-oo0779fd2ac.
html#axzzz5HbYJL9o. Consumption, which in the period from 1952-198o, as a percentage of
GDP, was around 62%, rose steadily to a plateau of about 70%. DUM9NIL & Ltw,supra note 66,
at 147 fig.I 0.3. For the impact of consumer rights movements on the transformation of retail-
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effective demand, consumers turned to debt by partaking of "overextended
credit.""1 This turn to debt-driven consumption was facilitated by public
policy and the market acting in concert, a combination appropriately
characterized the "state-finance nexus." '157 The intellectual justification
for new regulatory regimes was furnished by the overarching neoliberal
ideology augmented by the "efficient market hypothesis" that saw all
markets as efficient and self-adjusting entities which, left to their own,
would produce efficiency, innovation, supply and demand equilibrium,
and stability.15 Mythologies of neoliberal deregulation notwithstanding,
ers' credit policies, see LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC 381-85 (2003).
156 Caglar Keyder, Crisis, Underconsumption, andSocial Policy, in BUSINESS AS USUAL, supra
note 1o9, at 159, 165. Outstanding consumer debt as a percentage of disposable income grew
from 62% in 1975 to 127.2% in 2005. FOSTER & MADUFF, supra note 129, at 29 tbl.I.I. Gross
debt of households rose from 50% of GDP in I98O to 98% of GDP in 2007. Id. at 150 fig.Io.6.
Between 198o and 2008, the size of debt of all U.S. sectors as a percentage of GDP rose from
155% to 353% by 2oo8. DUMtNIL & Ltvy, supra note 66, at 104 tbl.7.2. The flow of interest paid
by households that was 4.4% of GDP in 1979, rose to in 5.7% in 2007. Id. at 65-66. The size
of debt of all U.S. sectors as percentage of GDP was 126% in 1952, 155% in 198o and rose dra-
matically to 353% by 2008. Id. at 104. From 1996 to 2ooo, all debt increased by an average of
USD 1.6 trillion per year, with household debt alone averaging over USD 400 billion per year,
at a time when the GDP grew at an average rate of about USD 5oo billion per year. Magdoff,
supra note 12, at 30-3i. From 2001 through 2007, all debt increased by USD 3 trillion per year,
with household debt increasing by USD 900 billion per year, while the GDP increased by less
than USD 600 billion per year. Id. at 3 1. At the end of 2oo8, 70% of U.S. families held credit
cards, with the total credit card debt reaching USD 972.73 trillion. Credit card statistics, industry
facts, and debt statistics, CREDIT CARDS, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-
card-industry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1 276.php (last visited August 25, 2012). In 2oo7,
interest paid by household and governments amounted to a total of 8.1% of GDP; this is larger
than the profits of nonfinancial enterprises that were 7.6% of GDP for that year. DUM9NIL &
Ltvy, supra note 66, at 65-66. Instructive literature on consumer credit in the U.S. includes,
DAVID EVANs & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PLAYING WITH PLASTIC: TRE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN
BUYING AND BORROWING (I999) (discussing the role of technology in the evolution of credit
card use); LLOYD KLEIN, IT'S IN THE CARDS: CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(1999); JOSEPH NOCERA, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: HOW THE MIDDLE CLASS JOINED THE MONEY
CLASS (1994); JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN 19-20 (1998) (discussing credit card
debt as it relates to the intensification of competitive consumption); BRETr WILLIAMS, DEBT
FOR SALE (2004). For the variety of lending and repayment practices of consumer credit, see
ROSE-MARIA GELPI, THE HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT: DOCTRINES AND PRACTICES (2000).
157 Harvey, supra note- IO, at 92.
158 JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: 'ME LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 97-107
(2009); JUSTIN Fox, ThE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND
DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 9, at 68-69; Timothy A. Cano-
va, The Failing Bubble Economy: American Exceptionalism and The Crisis in Legitimacy, 102 AM.
Soc'Y INT. L. PROC. 237, 238 (2008); Robert Wade, The First-World Debt Crisis of 2007-2010
in Global Perspective, 51 CHALLENGE 25, 34 (July/Aug. 2008). The efficient market hypothesis
views all human behavior as being uniformly dictated by an impulse to maximize gains and
all facets of life operating in a competitive market of some sort. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECO-
NOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5-6 (1976). For an insightful analysis of the efficient
market hypothesis, and the underlying neo-classical economic theory, see ROBERT SKIDELSKY,
KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER 29-51 (2009). One scholar notes that "an ideological
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elaborate new regulations were fashioned to pave the way for the
ascendency of finance capital. After over three decades of the neoliberal
era's ostensible deregulation, the financial sector remains "among the most
heavily regulated sectors of the American economy."'15 9 During the heyday
of neoliberal "deregulation," the U.S. had a regulatory regime with over 100
authorities overseeing different segments of the financial market. 6 '
Critical legislations that enabled neoliberal financialization included: the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,161
which eliminated interest rate caps; the addition of the 401(k) provision
backlash against state economic interventionism" played a key part in this reordering of the
markets. Philip G. Cerny, The Deregulation and Re-Regulation of Financial Markets in a More
Open World, in FINANCE AND WORLD POLITICS 5I, 51-53 (Philip G. Cerny ed., 1993). Another
notes the critical role of "widely shared ideological commitments" and "mindsets." David M.
Andrews, Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Towards a Structural Theory of International Mon-
etary Relations, 38 INT. STUD. Q. 193, 200-201 (1994). For critical evaluations, see DAN ARIELY,
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); Alexander
Rosenxberg, Can Economic Theory Explain Everything?, 9 PHiL. ov THE Soc. SCt. 509 (t979). The
foundational flaw of neoclassical economic theory is that that, "leaving history and its uncer-
tain movement out of the analysis imparts false sense of determinacy and predictability to the
economic process." Wallace C. Peterson, Institutionalism, Keynes and the Real World, I I J. ECON.
ISSUES, June 1977, at 213-14. In light of the 2007-2009 financial meltdown, it has been sug-
gested that "September 15, 2008, the date that Lehman Brothers collapsed, may be to market
fundamentalism.., what the fall of the Berlin wall was to communism." STIGLITZ, supra note
83, at 219. Even a storied herald of capitalism and globalization has now questioned the mon-
etarist, efficient-market, and rational-expectations thesis of neoliberalism. The Otherworldly
Philosophers, ECONOMIST, July 15, 2009, at 65-67.
159 FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, TIIE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
46 (9th ed. 2oo9). For perceptive analyses of the re-regulation of the finance industry, see
Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fun-
damentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARv. L. PoL'Y REV. 369, 388-96 (2009)
(analyzing the most important institutional and regulatory factors that have contributed to
the ongoing financial market failure and offering a framework for designing a new approach
to financial regulation that would meet the demands of the present); Timothy A. Canova, The
Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receiver-
ship, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295 (1995); Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts
Together Let No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009
American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371,410-20 ( oO) (analyzing the current finan-
cial crisis and stating proposals for future preventative regulations); Kristin N. Johnson, Things
FallApart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. CoLo. L. REV. 167 (2011) (analyz-
ing credit default swap markets by comparing them to traditional commons); Cathy Lesser
Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL " Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury
Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 561-75 (2000) (discuss-
ing the deregulation and its effect on the subprime mortgage equity lending industry).
16o Joanna Chung, Multi-Layered Patchwork Will Be Tough to Unpick, FIN. T[MES, Apr. 24,
2008, at 13 (quoted in Robert Wade, The First-World Debt Crisis of 2007-201o in Global Perspec-
tive, 51 CHALLENGE 23, 34, n.7 (July/Aug. 2oo8)).
161 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198o, Pub. L. No.
96-22 1,94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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to the tax code in 1980,162 which channeled savings into private pension
plans; the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which
allowed Savings and Loan Associations to engage in commercial lending
and corporate bonds;163 the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement
Act of 1984, which permitted investment banks to buy, pool, and resell
mortgages; 164 the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which created the Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduit, making mortgage-backed securities
more attractive;l65 the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enhancement Act of 1989, which rearranged the government-sponsored
mortgage-facilitating entities;16  the Interstate Banking and Branching Act
of 1994, which allowed banks to operate across state lines; 167 the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which made it difficult for
securities fraud plaintiffs to plead fraud; 168 the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977, which directed financial institutions to expand their market
base; 169 the Gramm-Leach Billey Act of 1999 that permitted comingling
of commercial and investment banking;171 the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, which left derivatives out of regulatory oversight;
171 and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, which made it more difficult for consumers to seek bankruptcy
162 An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to reduce income taxes, and
for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (978) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
401(k) (2oo6)) (going into effect Jan. I, I98O). For details, see ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF
THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDOING 24-25 (2004).
163 Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C).
164 Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat.
1689 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
165 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1oo Stat. 2o85 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). By phasing out the interest deduction on all forms of con-
sumer borrowing except for mortgages, this legislation also inaugurated the era of securitiza-
tion of consumer credit. Louis HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK
252-54 (2011).
166 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enhancement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
167 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328; lo8 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C).
168 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1o9 Stat. 737
(codifies as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
169 Community Re-Investment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006) and implemented by12 C.ER. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e).
While this legislation is often cited by free-market enthusiasts as the primary cause of the
mortgage meltdown, default rates on CRA lending are comparable to other areas of lending.
See STIGLITZ, supra note 83, at io.
I7o Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. Io6-102, 113 Stat, 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68O1-68o9 (2oo6)).
171 Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 1O6-554, 114 Stat.
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protection. 172 The courts and regulatory agencies played a supportive role
in the interpretation and enforcement of these provisions.173 This new legal
terrain was indispensable for the financialization of the U.S. economy and
consolidation of debt as a primary source of aggregate demand.
Law and public policy also played a critical role in enhancing liquidity,
the lifeblood of finacialization.174 This blood was first drawn from
workers' savings and expanded debt-creation through extraordinarily
loose monetary policy. The 401(k) provision of the tax code inaugurated
siphoning of workers' savings through privatization of pension funds.
Tapping this colossal reservoir of liquidity served three related functions:
it fed the ever growing indebtedness of firms and households, gave
workers a stake in the health of the financial markets, and augmented
the ideological ensemble of ownership society, workers-as-shareholders,
and "shareholder nation."175 The other crucial step in liquidity generation
was expansion and securitization of debt. In this context, "the purpose
of making loans, mortgages and offering credit cards [was], increasingly,
the generation of tradable financial assets based on the cycle of monthly
repayments."'76 Neoliberalism, which was inaugurated by a radically tight
172 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
1o9-8, I 19 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I I U.S.C.)see also Robert H.
Scott III, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act o2005: HoW the Credit Card
Industry's Perseverance Paid Off, 41 J. ECON. ISSUEs, Dec. 2007, at 943, 943.
173 In 1986, the courts upheld the Federal Reserve's ruling that commercial banks' plac-
ing commercial paper issued by corporations with investors did not violate Glass-Steagall.
Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, IO62-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). A November 2001 rule jointly adopted by the Office of Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Federal Reserve tied bank capital requirement in securitization to the ability of banks get
rating agencies to approve the investment; the rule was published in the Federal Register,
November 29, 2001. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 9, at 138-39. On April 28, 2004, SEC agreed
to allow large investment banks use their own "risk management practices for regulatory pur-
poses." Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consoli-
dated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4983 o , 82 SEC Docket 3515 (June
8, 2004); see also JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 9, at 14o; Stephen Labaton, Agency's '01 Rule Let
Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Ai. This decision facilitated in-
vestment banks to increase their leverage up to 40 to 1. STIGLITZ, supra note 83, at 163.
174 Indeed, the combination of subprime mortgages and securitization rested "program-
matically on the assumption that the important thing about debt is not its 'payability' but its
'liquidity."' AMATO & FANTACCI, supra note 140, at 63.
175 BONNER & WIGGIN, supra note 8, at 203; see PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLU-
TION: How'PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA (1976); Marleen O'Connor, Labor's
Role in the Shareholder Revolution, in WORKING CAPITAL: ThIE POWER OF LABOR'S PENSIONS 67
(Archon Fung et al. eds., 200 1). The proportion of pension funds channeled into stocks grew
from 35.1% (USD 871 billion) in 1980 to 49.5% (USD 8.6 trillion) in 2008. Susanne Soed-
erberg, Cannibalistic Capitalism: The Paradoxes of Neoliberal Pension Securitization, in SOCIALIST
REGISTER 2011: THE CRISIS THIS TIME 229 tbl.i (Leo Panitch et al. eds., 2OO).
176 Andrew Leyshon & Nigel Thrift, The Capitalization of Almost Everything: The Future of
Finance and Capitalism, 24 ThEORY, CULTURE & Soc'v, Dec. 2007, at 97, io6 (2007).
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monetary policy, now turned to a radically loose monetary policy to fuel
liquidity by keeping interest rates at historical lows.'77 Financial markets
relied on the Fed to keep the system awash with liquidity to sustain the
wealth-effect produced by credit-driven financialization. Particularly in
response to the dot-coin crash of the early 2000s, the Fed lowered interest
rates and kept them low, incessantly creating liquidity and a credit-fueled
boom.'78 This propelled "'artificial liquidity, ...... liquidity black holes,"' and
"Ponzi finance," the ubiquitous characterizations of the financial boom
that rested substantially on derivatives based on bundled and securitized
debt, particularly mortgages.'79 An accompanying recalibration of securities
laws facilitated the change from lend-and-hold to lend-and-distribute
banking and triggered "in-house debt collection" to increasingly give
way to a "debt sale market in personal finance."' 180 The exponential rise
in subprime mortgages was made possible by these general policies that
"stoked mortgage bonfire."'' The subprime sector of the mortgage finance
177 Before the neoliberal era, the ability of credit originators to grant new loans was high-
ly dependent on the support of public agency securitization and the levels of Federal Fund
rate. With neoliberalism, private-label securitization allowed credit originators to refinance
their activity as much as needed. Lenders became less vulnerable to shortage of liquidity
induced by tighter monetary policy, and securities pooled in vehicles were sold at long-term
rates in the rest of the world independent of Federal Reserve policies. DUMfNIL & Lvw, supra
note 66, at 199-200. One effect of financial globalization was the convergence of long-term
interest rates around the world, depriving the ability of national monetary authorities to adjust
rates for domestic purposes. Id., at 137. For convergence of rates worldwide, see id., at 138
fig.9.I. After the 2001 recession, long-term interest rates stopped responding to increases in
Federal Fund rates. For the relationship between the Federal Funds rate and long-term rates
between I98o and 2009, see id., at 198 fig. 14. 1. Alan Greenspan reported to Congress that "[t]
he drop in long-term rates is especially surprising given the increase in the federal funds rate
over the same period. Such a pattern is clearly without precedent in our experience." ALAN
GREENSPAN, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD'S SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS (July 20, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/july/testimony.htm.
178 The Fed overnight rate was lowered from 6% to I% on January 3, zoo0, and did not
rise until June 30, 2004. PwAMA DESAI, FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO GLOBAL RECOVERY 2 (201 i).
After correcting for inflation, negative rates prevailed during almost three years. DUMtNIL &
Lw, supra note 66, at 197-98; Greg Ip, Did Greenspan Addto Subprime Woes?, WALL ST. J., June
9, 2007, at BI. Housing demand and prices soured, and "[tihe supply of asset-backed securi-
ties doubled between 2003 and 2004, and doubled again between 2004 and 2005." Wade,
supra note 158, at 35.
179 Anastasia Nesvetailova & Ronen Palan, A Very North Atlantic Credit Crunch: Geopoliti-
calImplications ofthe GlobalLiquidity Crisis, 6z J. OF INT'L AFFAIRS, Fall/Winter 2oo8, at i65, i68.
18o DAWN BURTON, CREDIT AND CONSUMER SOCIETY 023 (2OO8).
i8I Jo Becker et al., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2008, at As, available at http://www.nytimes.com/zoo8/izls/business/zIadmin.html. Sub-
prime lending also presupposed the elaborate and varied legal regimes of foreclosure. See
Kelly D. Edmiston & Roger Zalneraitis, Rising Foreclosures in the United States: A Perfect Storm,
92 ECON. REV. i 15, 120-2 i (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2007)).
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industry grew at an annual rate of 25 percent between 1994 and 2003, and
was "the key to extending the asset-based welfare vision." 18
Far from being a "'democratization of finance,"'' 183 subprime mortgages
testify to the enduring grammar of modern power's engagement with
alterity as one of engulfment/subordination and not of exclusion."8 The
subprime-lending boom was "'reverse redlining' ".-marginalized groups
traditionally denied credit became targeted with high-risk credit. 186 It
demonstrated that, to grow and increase profits without engaging the sphere
of production, finance needed to spread its reach beyond the middle class
to the poor.' 7 Home ownership had long been advocated as an effective
tool of social control, indeed, a "'prophylactic against mob mind.""" The
liberalized financial markets were well-positioned to deploy this tool on
an ever-widening scale. With the neoliberal turn, equity markets propelled
by inflow of funds from newly created private pension schemes began to
rise and "[b]ig companies . . . increasingly relied on equity markets for
finance .... "189 In response, banks pushed lending into more marginal
markets, developed new financial instruments, and invented new ways
182 Paul Langley, Debt, Discipline, and Government. Foreclosure and Forbearance in the Sub-
prime Mortgage Market, 41 ENV'T AND PLAN. A 1404, 1410 (2009). See also RICHARD RONALD, THE
IDEOLOGY OF HOME OWNERSHIP: HOMEOWNER SOCIETIES AND THE ROLE OF HOUSING (2008);
Susan J Smith, Owner-Occupation:At Home with a Hybrid of Money and Materials, 40 ENV'T AND
PLAN. A 520 (2oo8).
183 PETER GOSSELIN, HIGH WIRE: THE PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL LIVES OF AMERICAN FAMI-
LIES 183 (2008) (quoting finance expert Gregory Elliehausen).
184 For an insightful refutation of the exclusion thesis in the context of race relations, see
DENISE FERREIRA DA SILVA, TOWARDS A GLOBAL IDEA OF RACE (2007).
185 Fiona Allon, Speculating on Everyday Life: The Cultural Economy of the Quotidian, 34 J.
OF COMM. INQ. 366, 368 (2010).
186 Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to
Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 165, 176-79 (2oIo). For racial
wealth inequality partly resulting from lack of access to credit, see MELVIN OLIVER, BLACK
WEALTH / WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 136-41 (1995). For a
comparison of assets and debt use between black and white households, see HYMAN, supra
note 165, at 139-4 o , Figs.5.2 & 5.3. Racial minorities traditionally paid higher interest rates on
mortgage loans. Id., at 143-44, Figs.5.4 & 5.5. Indeed, "FHA policies led to a systematic disin-
vestment in black-owned housing." Id. at 341, n. I. For a detailed exposition of the impact of
public policies on minority housing, see THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS:
RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 7 (1996). For how class impacted credit availabil-
ity, see Consumer Credit and the Poor Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Committee
on Banking and Currency, 9oth Cong. 3-5 (1968) (statement of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission).
187 Andrea Fumagalli, The Global Economic Crisis and Socioeconomic Governance, in CRISIS
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: FINANCIAL MARKETS, SOCIAL STRUGGLES, AND NEW POLITICAL SCE-
NARIOS 64 (Andrea Fumagilli & Sandro Mezzadra eds., 2OO).
188 BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE
EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 133-34 (1978) (quoting Sociologist Ross).
189 Wade, supra note 158, at 30 (2008).
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to make mortgage loans to lower-income workers whom lenders had
previously avoided. 190 Alan Greenspan expressly acknowledged this move:
"innovation and deregulation have vastly expanded credit availability to
virtually all income classes."u I Ferreting out economically marginal groups
for mortgage and consumer credit expanded the scope of the financial
market. "Bottom-feeding" on the "unbanked" and "uncarded ethnics"
became a lucrative growth field.19 In this process "[elconomically marginal
people constituted, in effect, a 'developing country' within the United States." '93
African Americans, who historically had limited access to credit markets
on account of racial prejudice and discrimination, now became "the most
profitable group to lend to." 94 Gender also intersected with race and class
in this schema. As women constituted an ever-increasing proportion of
recipients of subprime loans, "single, female, with two children, in her
first home" became the profile of a typical subprime borrower seeking
foreclosure counseling. 9 '
For the borrowers, the subprime mortgages boom was "asset-based
welfare"; 196 a "welfare trade-off' emerged between housing as a social
right secured by public resources -and homeownership as a mode to
accumulate and store wealth. 97 Neoliberal contraction of the redistributive
19o For details, see EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST
BOOM AND BUST 6 (2007); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 23-24 (2008).
191 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Federal Reserve
System's Fourth Annual Community Affairs Research Conference (Apr. 8, 2005) (transcript
available at http:llwww.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/20o5/z005o4o8/default.htm).
192 HYMAN, supra note 7, at 270 (quoting Kevin Higgins, Bottom Feeding, in CREDIT CARD
MANAGEMENT 62 (1994)).
193 Wade, supra note i58, at 31 (emphasis added).
194 H-YMAN, supra note 7, at 243. This was because due to lesser wealth and income, Af-
rican American borrowers were three times as likely to revolve their debts. Id. At the height
of subprime lending boom in 2oo6, nearly 55 percent of loans to African Americans were
subprime, despite the fact that many of those borrowers qualified for prime loans. Editorial,
Mortgages and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2oo8, at A34. For a comprehensive history of po-
litical economy of racism in the U.S., see DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED:
RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA (Ioth Anniversary ed., 2010); MELVIN LEIMAN,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM (1993).
195 See Allen J. Fishbein & Patrick Woodall, Women Are Prime TargetsforSubprime Lending:
Women Are Disproportionately Represented in High-Cost Mortgage Market, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM.
(Dec. 2oo6), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/WomenPrimeTargetsStudyI2o6o6.pdf. For
historical gender discrimination in availability of credit, see HYMAN, supra note 7, at 191-206.
196 Allon, supra note i85, at 377.
197 Leonard Seabrooke, What Do I Get? The Everyday Politics of Expectations and the Sub-
prime Crisis, 15 NEW POL. ECON. 51, 56 (20o0). For the need of lower-income groups to use
credit for subsistence needs, see JANIS BOWDLER, NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, SURVIVAL SPEND-
ING: THE ROLE OF CREDIT CARDS IN HISPANIC HOUSEHOLDS (2Oio); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Ex-
porting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS
L.J. 59 (2007); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position,
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function of the welfare state was complemented by "privatization of
deficit spending"19 -- creation of aggregate demand through private debt.
Demand for credit and complex financial products did not naturally flow
from their supply; it had "to be created, and liquidity relied critically on
demand being whipped up."' Financial markets cultivated expectations
of infinite increases in asset prices and the resulting wealth-effect-an
inflationary increase without which it would be impossible to co-opt the
have-nots.
Legal regimes played a pivotal role in the expansion and securitization of
sub-prime loans and in their channeling into global financial markets. 0 It
was "the securitization rules themselves made all this possible, and indeed
desirable." ' State intervention in the home mortgage business had started
with the creation of the Home Owner's Loan Corporation in response to the
collapse of the property market and the real estate bond market following the
Great Depression. 02 New Deal legislation designed to support the housing
market created FHA to provide lenders with protection against losses and
established Fannie May to buy mortgage loans of banks, thus providing
them liquidity to expand mortgage lending. 0 3 For over four decades, such
public backing facilitated expansion of home-ownership by high-wage
40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 557 (2009); Christian E. Weller, Need or Want: What Explains the Run-up in
Consumer Debt?, 41 J. EcoN. ISSUES, June 2007, at 583.
198 Christian Marazzi, supra note 121, at 31.
i99 Nesvetailova & Palan, supra note 179, at I66. As Stiglitz reports: "The economy
grew, but mainly because American families were persuaded to take on more debt, refinanc-
ing their mortgages and spending some of the proceeds. And, as long as housing prices rose as
a result of lower interest rates, Americans could ignore their growing indebtedness." Joseph
Stiglitz, America' Day of Reckoning, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.project-syn-
dicate.org/commentary/stiglitz9o/English.
2oo A comprehensive study of concludes:
The government made the resale of debt possible, not just through the enforce-
ment of contracts, but in many instances by actually creating the basic institutions
for buying and selling loans - making markets - like the government-made quasi-
corporation Fannie Mae.... [I]t was not by the invisible hands of the market but
by the visible minds of policymakers that new financial instruments and institu-
tions were invented.
HYMAN, supra note 7, at 2-3.
201 AMATO & FANTACCI, supra note 140, at 73.
202 For details, see HYmAN, supra note 7, at 49-5o; Kenneth A. Snowden, Mortgage Se-
curitization in the United States: Twentieth Century Developments in Historical Perspective, in AN-
GLO-AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN THE TPWENTIETH CENTURY
276-88 (Michael D. Bordo and Richard Sylla eds., 1995); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2185, 2 194-99 (2007).
203 DUMgNIL & LgvY, supra note 66, at 185-87. In 1934 the National Housing Act created
the Federal Housing Administration, and in 1938 the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) was set up. For details, see LEONARD SEABROOKE, TYIE SOCIAL SOURCES OF FINAN-
CIAL POWER: DOMESTIC LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORDERS 125 (oo6). Fannie
Mae bought and sold mortgages, thus creating a secondary market for mortgages that linked
lender, insurers and investors. HYMAN, supra note 7, at 53-70.
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
earners-the so-called "middle class." As wages started to stagnate in
the 1970s and the existing mortgage market was saturated, public policy
promoted a broadening of this market by inducing the financial sector
to reach new borrowers and develop new financial instruments1 ° Often
discourses of civil rights and equal access and opportunity were deployed
to effectuate the changes. Salutary as the stated objectives were, bringing
the marginalized into circuits of credit at a time when financialization and
debt-driven demand generation was taking root, the consequences for
the purported beneficiaries were disastrous. Ginnie Mae, created to cater
particularly to low-income and minority borrowers, invented mortgage-
backed securities 0 -5 Freddie Mac was created with the specific purpose
of securitizing mortgage loans and selling those in secondary markets. 06
The first-ever mortgage-based security sale by Ginnie Mae in 1970
was hailed by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development as "a
revolutionary step." 07 Subsequent legislations explicitly forbade redlining
practices and required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to concentrate more
on the lower income and minority groups. 08 Soon, next to the Treasury
Department, Freddie Mac was the largest debt-issuing institution in U.S.
capital markets. 0 9 Wall Street became "addicted to mortgage-backed
204 The Housing Act of 1968 also authorized the Treasury Department to act as a buyer
of last resort of mortgage-backed securities. HYMAN, supra note 7, at 232. For affordable hous-
ing goals of government-sponsored entities, and the growth of the mortgage market, securiti-
zation and share of the market, see VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE,
FREDDIE MAC AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 34 fig.2.t, 42 fig.3.I (zoI I); Lewis S.
Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in A PRIMER
OF SECURITIZATION 31 (Leon T Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996); Joseph C. Shenker
& Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX.
L. REv. 1369 (991).
205 JOHNSON & KWAK, 13 BANKERS, supra note 7, at 123. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968
(Title VIII), the Fair Housing Act that created Ginnie Mae to cater particularly to low-income
and minority borrowers, also created mortgage-back securities paving the way for resale of
debt as a financial investment. HYMAN, supra note 7, at 221, 225-30.
206 Seabrooke, supra note 203, at 125-3 o .The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970
created Freddie Mac, and permitted Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to expand secondary mar-
kets in home mortgages by buying and pooling mortgages and selling those as mortgage-
backed securities in the open market. Id.; HYMAN, supra note 7, at 23 1. The Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of I992 required Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to concentrate more on the lower income and minority groups, and to improve systemic
credit assessments. Guy STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK: THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUS-
TRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 192 (2003).
207 Louis Hyman, Op-Ed., The House That George Romney Built, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012,
at A27 (quoting George C. Romney).
2o8 The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 explicitly forbade redlining practices.
STUART, supra note 2o6, at I I0. For a detailed exposition of the role of Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac in the mortgage finance crisis, see ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 204, at 31-79.
2o9 HYMAN, supra note 7, at 232. For details, see Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, In Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 149 (2009).
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securities" and the demand for subprime loans by banks and investors
outstripped their supply ° By modifying Keynesian-era legal regimes
and fashioning new ones, neoliberal policies had ignited the subprime
mortgage frenzy."1 ' With foreigners holding one-third of the debt of the
two agencies, compared with 13 percent of the U.S. mortgage-backed
securities market in general, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, together "the
single largest player in the game,"2 1' served as the key link between global
finance and the U.S. mortgage market.1 3 Hailed at the time as instruments
of progressive expansion of home-ownership, the expanded borrower-
base and mortgage-backed securitization had three inter-linked effects:
ever-larger sections of the working classes were brought within the fold
of housing debt, the secondary markets for these securities helped syphon
global savings to the U.S., and the size and profits of finance exploded .
I4
The entrapment of the working classes and the marginalized into
circuits of credit, then, resulted from the financial sector's search for depth
and liquidity as debt became the primary instrument to sustain aggregate
demand. Redesigned legal regimes and public agencies were critical to this
transformation.
IV. THE NEW ECONOMY AND PRECARIOUS LABOR MARKETS
The turn to debt by the working classes was also propelled by the
rise of precarious labor markets."5 Besides the demise of unions and
210 JOHNSON & KWAK, 13 BANKERS, supra note 9, at 124-25. For the share of the mortgage
market backed by public entities, see ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 204, at 21 fig. i.i (z I).
In 1994, 32% of subprime loans were securitized for a value of USD I i billion; in 2003, the
figures rose to 6I % and USD 203 billion. DAWN BURTON, supra note I8o, at 8I tbl.4.4 (2oo8).
211 By the end of thei99os, the value of outstanding mortgage-backed securities was
USD I trillion, with the share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at 90%. SEABROOKE, supra note
203, at 126-27. By 2oo8, this had grown to USD 5.3 trillion. By 2003, the total liabilities, both
standard securities and mortgage-backed securities of these institutions reached 53% of GDP.
This amount compares to 136% of all assets of banks and insurance, or, equivalently, 132% for
all financial assets of mutual and pension funds. DUMfNIL & Ltvsupra note 66, at 185-87. Be-
tween 2001 and 2oo6, while conforming mortgages declined from USD 128o billion to USD
990 billion, subprime rose from USD 12o billion to USD 600 billion, and nonprime climbed
from 14% of the market to 48% of the market. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 204, at 46 tbl.3. I. For
the increasingly risky lending activity by government-sponsored entities between 2003 and
2007, see id. at 59 tbl.3.4. Use of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as an insurance hedge against
the expanding securitized investment instruments induced riskier speculation. See MICHAEL
LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 104-O8, 201-12 (2010).
212 Daniel Chirot, A Turning Point or Business as Usual?, in BUSINESS As USUAL, supra note
i09, at i21.
213 Richard Roll, Benefits to Homeowners from Mortgage Portfolios Retained by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, 23 J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 29,36 (2003).
214 Between 1982 and 2007, profits of financial corporations as a percentage of total cor-
porate profits rose from 5% to 41%, Wade, supra note 158, at 33.
215 For precarization of labor, see GERALD RAUNING, A THOUSAND MACHINES: A CONCISE
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compression of wages, compelling corollary changes in the employment
landscape have included the reduction of socially necessary labor, the rise
of flexible contingent labor, and the growth of ever-vaster pools of free
labor. In a new "age of the superfluous worker,"116 a growing segment of
the working class forms part of the "precariat, ' 1 7 signified by jobs that are
temporary, low-wage, and without benefits or protections. The contingent
workforce includes independent contractors, contracted workers, leased
employees, part-time employees, and temporary employees. 1 8 Estimates
of the numbers of contingent workers range between twenty to thirty
percent of the work force."' 9 This "crisis of work" ' and "contingency
explosion" ' issued from firms' drive to maximize labor market flexibility,
changes in information technologies, the rise in forms of work that avoid
employee status and its accompanying legal structures, and firms' desire to
avoid unions."' 2 Fordist era forms of work, based on full-time employment,
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MACHINE AS SOCIAL MOVEMENT 75-90 (Aileen Derieg trans., 2010); Brett
Neilson & Ned Rossiter, From Precarity to Precariousness and Back Again: Labour Life and Un-
stable Networks, 5 FIBRECULTURE 1. (2OOS), http:lljournal.fibreculture.orglissue51neilsonros-
siter.html; Vassilis Tsianos & Dimitris Papadopoulos, Precarity: A Savage Journey into the Heart
of Embodied Capitalism, io EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR PROGRESSIVE CULTURAL POLICIES (2OO6),
http://eipcp.net/transversal/i i o6/tsianospapadopoulos/en.
216 Herbert J. Gans, Op-Ed., TheAge ofthe Superfluous Worker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011,
at A3 5 ; see also Dave Jamieson, The New Blue Collar: Temporary Work, Lasting Poverty And The
American Warehouse, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2011, 8:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/20 11/ 2/2o/new-blue-collar-temp-warehousesfn_ I 15849o.html.
2 17 THE CRISIS AND THE LEFT ix (Leo Panitch, Greg Albo & Vivek Chibber eds., 2011),
218 For studies of the rise of temporary work in the U.S., see CONTINGENT WORK: AMERI-
CAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION (Kathleen Barker and Kathleen Christensen eds.,
1998); ERIN HATTON, THE TEMP ECONOMY: FROM KELLY GIRLS TO PERMATEMPS IN POSTWAR
AMERICA (2011); Ross PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOWTO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN
THE BRAVE NEw ECONOMY (z2o i); LEAM F. VOSKO, TEMPORmAY WORE: Te GENDERED RtSE OF A
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (2000).
219 RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY,
PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 15 (1989); STANLEY NOLLEN & HELEN AXEL, MAN-
AGING CONTINGENT WORKERS: HOW TO REAP THE BENEFITS AND REDUCE THE RISKS 9-1o (1996).
220 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 COR-
NELL L. REV. 523, 524-26 (1997). See also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
NEW DATA ON CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS (Aug. 1995); JER-
EMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF
THE POST-MARKET ERA 3-6 (1995); William Bridges, The EndofJobs, FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 1994,
at 6z; Janice Castro, Disposable Workers, TIME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 43; Lance Morrow, The Temping
ofAmerica, TIME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 40.
221 Stephen F Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and CriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 368 (2002).
222 "The increase in 'contingent work' is largely the result of the way in which employ-
ers offer jobs to increase flexibility with uncertain product demand and to reduce labor costs
by retaining a smaller core of year round full-time workers ...." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT: COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS 22 (19 94 );sSee generally BELOUS, supra note 219 (analyzing the growth of
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clear-cut occupational assignments, and a career pattern over the life cycle
eroded. Racial discrimination and the widespread availability of flexible
peripheral labor markets combined to increase social inequality and
marginalization.2 2 3 The rise of contingent work also directly contributed to
the decline of unions and wages."2 4 As a result, an increasing portion of the
workforce received less wages and benefits.
Revolutionary changes in information and communication technologies
combined with changes in the organization of production increasingly
changed the very nature of work and attendant social rights,"5 Reduction
of labor costs in both private and public sectors was achieved through lean
production and outsourcing. While just-in-time production organized
labor in the most flexible way possible to avoid accumulation of inventory,
outsourcing helped avoid social costs of labor."2 6 With the demise of Fordist
the contingent economy and the forces that have driven its development); Richard S. Belous,
The Rise of the Contingent Workforce: The Key Challenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
863 (t995) (analyzing key questions raised by the growth of the contingent work farce in the
economic and political climate). See also Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing
Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557, 571 (1996) ("One
of the primary motivations for employers to move to contingent work arrangements is to avoid
employment regulations."). The judiciary has treated contingent workers as having weaker
entitlements to protections under unjust dismissal laws. Mark Berger, Unjust Dismissal and the
Contingent Worker: Restructuring Doctrine for the Restructured Employee, I6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV.
1, 7-8 (1997).
223 For a detailed study, see MARTIN CARNOY, FADED DREAMS: THE POLITICS AND Eco-
NOMICS OF RACE IN AMERICA (1994).
224 Many contingent workers are technically not employees of any entity and therefore
not covered by NLRA. Others, though legally classified as employees, are often excluded
from bargaining units on account of insufficient community of interest with permanent em-
ployees. Leased employees cannot be included in bargaining units of user firm's employees
without consent of both joint employers. See Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the
United States, 18 COMp. LAB. L.J. 503, 505 (1997); Katherine M. Forster, Note, Strategic Reform
of Contingent Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 558 (2001); Bita Rahebi, Comment, Rethinkingthe Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's Treatment of Temporary Workers: Granting Greater Access to Union-
iuntion, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1 I06 (2000). Part-time employees earned 58 percent of the
hourly wage of median full-time employees in 1989, and the average hourly wage for tempo-
rary employees in 1994 was 35 percent lower than it was for full-time employees. Middleton,
supra note 222, at 565; Karst, supra note 22o, at 525 n. I I. Only 22 percent of part-time workers
received health care benefits through their employers in 1988 as compared to 78 percent of
full-time employees. Middleton, supra. For the link between contingent employment and
growing income inequality, see BENNETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN:
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA 74-75 (1988).
225 For detailed expositions of this transformation, see URSULA Huws, THE MAKING OF
A CYBERTARIAT: VIRTUAL WORK IN A REAL WORLD (2003); ROBERT B. REiCH, THE WORK OF NA-
TIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 2 I--CENTURY CAPITALISM (1992); WORKING UNDER DIFFER-
ENT RULES (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994).
226 For details, see CHRISTIAN MARAZZI, CAPITAL AND AFFECTS: THE POLITICS OF THE LAN-
GUAGE ECONOMY 19-35 (Giuseppina Mecchia trans., Semiotext(e) 2011).
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and Taylorist production systems,"2 7 direct command and control over
the production process was increasingly substituted with marketplace
command. Taylorist modes of direct allocation of tasks were increasingly
replaced by indirect mechanisms based on imperatives to deliver and
unavoidable pressures of precarization of the wage relation.2 8 The labor
force had to adapt to the increasingly volatile process of value creation;
indeed, the pressure was to constantly "reinvent oneself."' 9 The just-in-
time inventory management and optimal scheduling led to just-in-time
labor.2 3° The working classes faced new market imperatives to be adaptable
and "multivalent."' 31 Flexible production produced flexible individuals
who changed jobs frequently and whose social relations were increasingly
transitory.32 As a result, a growing number of workers lived"neither inside
nor outside the world of work, but along its margins.... [inhabiting] a new
netherworld, the vocational purgatory of the 'unjob. '1 33
In a financialized economy, "profit, like rent, increasingly depend
on mechanisms of value expropriation that proceed from a position of
exteriority in respect of the organization of production."' 34 The new
speculative profit-making rested on the value-making capabilities of
"common work."135 Labor practices made possible by new information
227 Fordism refers to the system of industrial mass production symbolized by the as-
sembly line of auto production introduced by Henry Ford.. Under Fordism, industrial workers
are paid relatively high wages to generate demand for products of industrial mass production.
For details, see ANTONIO GRAMsci, Americanism and Fordism, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIS-
ON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., trans.,
197 1). Named after industrial engineer Frederick Taylor, Taylorism is an industrial efficiency
methodology that breaks down each task to small and simple segments that can be easily
taught and replicated. Taylorism introduced time and motion study to promote optimum job
performance, cost accounting, and tool and work-station design. For details, see ROBERT KANI-
GEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF'EFFICIENCY (1997).
228 The wage form itself has changed with fixed salary increasingly replaced by adjust-
able performance-based remuneration. MAzzi, supra note zz6, at 47-48. This facilitates a
servile labor force constrained to demonstratedevotion and obedience, under the penalty of
losing work. Id. at 44-47.
229 Giuseppina Mecchia, Introduction to MARAzzi, supra note 226, at 10.
230 MARAzzI, supra note 226, at 17-25.
231 MAAzz, supra note 226, at 23.
232 RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF
WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM 46-63 (1998).
233 GOSSELIN, supra note 183, at 142.
234 Vercellone, supra note 135, at 91.
235 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, COMMONWEALTH 155 (Paperback ed., Harvard
University Press 2011) (2OO9). This phenomenon is yet another appropriation of the commons
for private gain, an enduring feature of capitalism. For example, the widespread knowledge
base of the working classes tapped into by cognitive capitalism in conditions of precarization
of work, is the fruit of socialized education supplied by the welfare state.
[T]he truly driving sectors of an economy founded on knowledge arc not found in
the private R&D laboratories. Such a driving role is instead played by the collec-
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technologies expanded the scope of immaterial labor, helping to blur
the line between work and non-work. As a result, increasingly processes
of production of value traditionally confined to the place of work spread
"throughout the whole society." '36 Here we see deployment of bio-labor:
"life put to work, outside the times officially certified by private law." '37
The new order becomes one of externalization of the production process, of
"crowdsourcing"23 s and "unpaid labor" '39 of the crowd. The consumer-as-
producer phenomenon is part of this complex. Bagging one's own groceries
and self-service at IKEA are emblematic examples of externalizing fixed
and variable costs. Similarly, open-source information systems shift costs
of labor to consumers through mechanisms like externalization of program
evaluation, beta-testing, user technical assistance, and open-source
program development.2 '
The information/communication revolution resulted in the centrality of
cognitive/non-material labor, the loss of the strategic importance of fixed
capital, and the transfer of a series of productive-instrumental functions
to the living body of labor-power. This rapidly unfolding phenomenon
tive man for man productions, traditionally assured by the common institutions of
the welfare state according to a non-commercial logic. This element explains the
extraordinary pressure exercised by capital to privatize collective welfare services,
and this is both for its strategic role in the growth of the social demand and in
biopolitical and bioeconomic control of the population.
Vercellone, supra note 135, at I I I.
236 For a detailed analysis, see Marazzi, supra note 121, at 37-42.
237 Fumagalli, supra note 187, at 81-82.
238 JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE
OF BUSINESS (2008).
"These crowdsourcing technologies represent the new organic composition of capital,
i.e., the relation between constant capital diffused in society and variable capital that is de-
localized, de-spatialized and dispersed in the sphere of reproduction, consumption, forms of
life, and individual and collective imaginaries." Marazzi, supra note 12! , at 41.
239 Marazzi, supra note 12 1, at 38-39.
240 For detailed analyses, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How So-
CIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); I MANUEL CASTELLS, ThE RISE
OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2d ed.
201o); John Banks & Sal Humphreys, The Labour of User Co-Creators: Emergent Social Network
MarketsP, 14 CONVERGENCE: THE INT'L J. OF RES. INTO NEW MEDIATECH. 401 (2008). The key
phrases of the post-crass New Economy were "social web" or "web 2.o." These models were
based on their ability to attract masses of users who create a world of social relations on the
bases of cost-free web platforms, to harness user browsing, and applications that allow extrac-
tion of value from common actions like linking a site, flagging a blog post, modifying soft-
ware, etc. Web 2.0 proved a winning model for investors since it harnesses, incorporates and
valorizes users' social and technological labor, through marginalization of waged labor and the
valorization of free user labor: unpaid and undirected labor, which is nonetheless controlled by
its insertion into a value appropriation circuit. For detailed analyses, see ALEXANDER R. GALLO-
WAY, PROTOCOL: How CONTROL ExIsTs AFTER DECENTRALIZATION (2004); TIzIANA TERRANOVA,
NETWORK CULTURE: POLITICS FOR THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).
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is evocatively labeled "cognitive capitalism"' 41  Knowledge-based
innovation and value-production by highly skilled precarious labor are
distinct features of cognitive capitalism. Armed with new technologies,
immaterial organizational systems "pursu[ed] workers in every moment of
their lives ... [and] the work day, the time of living labor, is extended and
intensified. 2 4 Modalities of value production moved "from factory to the
social factory."' 43 The information revolution procreated a new labor culture
that had absorbed the need for liberty and informality born of the preceding
cycle of social struggles, imported the dissolution of the borders between
work-time and life-time from academic labor, and possessed the ideology
of entrepreneurship.2 44 It produced a new economic model capable of
generating value by mass use of the internet.145 In this realm, ubiquitous
activities such as using a search engine, visiting a website, even carrying a
cell phone that transmits the carrier's location, generate opportunities for
enterprises to harvest value without CoStS.
46
"Skill-biased technological change" is a dominant explanation for
inequality trends in the United States, with the computer/internet
revolution and the failure of education to keep pace with the growing
skill demands of the knowledge economy cited as the main reasons.
47
Analysts discerned a "new digital divide" that runs along class and racial
241 For an articulation of the hypothesis of cognitive capitalism, see YANN MOULIER Bou-
TANG, COGNITIVE CAPITALISM (English ed., Ed Emery trans., Polity Press 201i) (2008); Ber-
nard Paulr6, Cognitive Capitalism and the Financialization of Economic Systems, in CRISIS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: FINANCIAL MARKETS, SOCIAL STRUGGLES, AND NEW POLITICAL SCENARIOS
171 (Andrea Fumagalli & Sandro Mezzadra eds., 2010); Carlo Vercellone, From Formal Sub-
sumption to General Intellect: Elements for a Marxist Reading of the Thesis of Cognitive Capitalism, 15
HIST. MATERIALISM 13 (2007).
242 Marazzi, supra note 121, at 41.
243 Federico Chicchi, On the Threshold of Capital, At the Thresholds of the Common: Sidenotes
on the Ambivalences of Biopolitical Capitalism, in CRISIS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: FINANCIAL
MARKETS, SOCIAL STRUGGLES, AND NEW POLITICAL SCENARIOS 139, 144 (Andrea Fumagalli &
Sandro Mezzadra eds., 2010).
244 For a detailed analysis, see ANDREW Ross, NO-COLLAR: THE HUMANE WORKPLACE AND
ITS HIDDEN COSTS (2003).
245 Tim O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0, O'REILLY (Sept. 30, 20o5), http://oreilly.com/web2/
archive/what-is-web-2o.html.
246 This phenomenon is captured well by the following: "You may not know it, but if
you carry a smartphone in your pocket, you are probably doing unpaid work for Apple or
Google-and helping them eventually aim more advertising directly at you." Miguel Helft,
Phone Data Used to FillDigitalMap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. a6, 2o I, at B I; see also Stephen Baker, The
Next: Companies May Soon Know Where Customers are Likely to be Every Minute of the Day, Bus.
WK., Mar. 9, 2009, at 42, 44-45.
247 See, e.g., David H. Autor et al., The Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, May 2oo6, 189, 19I-92; David H. Autor et al., The Skill Content
of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration, 118 Q.J. EGON., Nov. 2003, at 1279,
128o; David H. Autor et al., Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Re-Assessing the Revisionists (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1 1627, 2005).
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divides 4 and is marked by deep socio-economic distinctions between
"the networkers ... the networked ... the switched-off" and between "the
deciders ... the participants ... the executants. ' ' 49 In this context, higher
education and incessant skills-development play an increasingly critical role
in establishing an individual's ranking in the hierarchy of employability."' 0
At the same time, public education faced disinvestment, and the cost
of education spiraled."' As a result, reliance on debt for education and
retraining soared. Surging above one trillion dollars, student-loans now
exceed credit-card and auto-loan debt.
25 2
In the context of a financialized economy, with precarization of
labor, demands for enhanced skills, and contraction of public support for
education and re-training, increasing reliance on debt to re-train, indeed to
live, becomes the only available option for the working classes.
V DISCIPLINE OF DEBT
Throughout history, debt both lubricated circuits of value extraction
and acted as a disciplinary device. From Athenian debt-bondage to
contemporary labor trafficking, debt-peonage has been part of labor
management regimes across a variety of modes of production. The
historical role of debt in moral discipline is evidenced by the fact that in all
Indo-European languages, words for debt are synonymous with those for
sin or guilt.5 3 Debt has also played a foundational role in modern imperial
248 Susan P. Crawford, The New Digital Divide, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at SRI.
249 CASTELLS, supra note 240, at 26o.
25o For a detailed analysis of the nexus between education and economic growth, see
ALISON WOLF, DOES EDUCATION MATTER?: MYTHS ABOUT EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
(2002).
251 The average tuition at a four-year non-profit college in 2009-IO was $21,324, while
at public colleges it was $10,747. Tamar Lewin, What's theMost Expensive College? The Least? Ed-
ucation Dept. Puts ItAll Online, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A8. Between 1999 to 2009, tuition
at public two-year colleges increased 71%, while the median family income, adjusted for infla-
tion, declined 4.9%. Id. Between I989 and 2oo9, law school tuition shot up 317%. David Segal,
Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BI. For the political economy
of education under neoliberalism, see John Bellamy Foster, Education and the Structural Crisis
of Capital: The U.S. Case, 63 MONTHLY REV., 2011, at 6, 7-10, 14,30. These developments have
helped trigger student protests. See SPRINGTIME: TIHE NEW STUDENT REBELLIONS 1-2 (Clare
Solomon & Tania Palmieri eds., 2011).
252 Josh Mitchell & Maya Jackson-Randall, Student-Loan Debt Tops $i Trillion, WALL
ST. J., March 22, 2012, at A5; Tom Raum, Student Loan Debt Threatening Economic Recovery,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr., 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.cOm/20 12/04/03/student-loan-
debt-recovery-ni399136.html. Loans accounted for one-third of the 130 billion paid for un-
dergraduate education in 2006, and student loans from private bank loans to students jumped
from almost nothing in the mid-199os to 17 billion USD. PETER GOSSELIN, HIGH WIRE: THE
PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL LIVES OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 225 (2oo8).
253 GEOFFREY INGHAM, THE NATURE OF MONEY 90 (2004).
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domination. During the colonial era, colonial powers often intervened
militarily to enforce debt contracts. 5 4 After decolonization, conditions
accompanying international credits were deployed to control public policies
of post-colonial formations. 5 The recurrent international debt crises of
the last three decades were used to enforce neoliberal restructuring of
economies of debtor states. 56 Debt. levels of corporations unavoidably
tend to discipline the employment relationship as firms with higher debt
reduce their payroll, use more part time employees, pay lower wages, and
have anemic pension plans." 7 The disciplinary impact of debt in all these
instances issued from direct coercion and/or express provisions of debt
contracts. What is distinctive about the neoliberal era is the self-discipline
of debtors procreated by governmentalities that are unencumbered by
direct coercion or express undertakings.
In the perennial search for effective modes to contain and control the
dispossessed, debt surfaced on the agenda of American ruling classes at
least as early as the early 1900s. In particular, home mortgage was advocated
as an effective tool of social control, indeed, a "prophylactic against mob
mind." '58 As organized labor took roots, captains of industry recommended
that workers should be induced to "invest their savings in their homes and
own them. Then they won't leave and they won't strike. It ties them down
so they have a stake in our prosperity." '59 While a beginning was made
along this agenda during the Keynesian era, neoliberal financialization
dramatically expanded the scope and reach of credit in general and
mortgage-driven home-ownership in particular. Neoliberalism opened
up new frontiers for the disciplinary operations of debt: self-discipline by
indebted masses engulfed by the financialized economy and refashioned
governmentalities.
Neoliberal economic policies and an attending discourse of personal
responsibility furnished the grounds for the symbiosis of debt and discipline.
Neoliberal rationality aims at congruence between a responsible and moral
individual and an economic-rational actor: a prudent subject whose moral
quality rests on rational assessment of economic costs and benefits of
their actions. The prescription of subjectivity to obtain interiorization of
the market's goal in the context of precarization of labor is accomplished
254 NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 98-
100(2009).
255 For details, see CHERYL PAYER, DEBT TRAP: T E IMF AND THE THIRD WORLD, ix-xiii
(1974).
256 For details, see Tayyab Mahmud, Is it Greek or D&jt Vu All Over Again: Neoliberalism
and Winners andLosers of International Debt Crises, 42 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 661-68 (2011).
257 Gordon Hanka, Debt and the Terms of Employment, 48 J. FIN. ECoN. 245, 247-49 (1998).
258 EDWARD ALSWORTH Ross, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 89 (I908).
259 CHARLES HARRIS WHITAKER, THE JOKE ABOUT HOUSING 9 (1920) (emphasis added)
(quoting a business manager).
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through generalization of debt. The result is an assemblage that "accepts"
itself as a homo economicus,Z60 "a dependent subjectivity, a subjectivity
conforming to capital, and in which the rationality of homo economicus, of
human capital, replaces the idea of social rights and common goods. '2 61 This
ensures self-discipline whereby time and life both within and outside
the bounds of any specific site of production remain subjected to value
production.
Neoliberalism fashioned "workfare regimes" intended to "throw a long
shadow, shaping the norms, values, and behavior of the wider population,
and maintaining a form of order." 6 Evocatively styled, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, ended "welfare as we know
it" 63 and instituted "workfare": forced deskilled wage labor as the sole
means of support on the pretext of setting the indigent on the road to
"independence."' 66 Similarly, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act
of 1998 radically reduced public housing and turned the indigent towards
private rental markets. 6 Workfare underscored the imperative of wage
labor by issuing "a warning to all Americans who are working more and
earning less, if they are working at all. There is a fate worse, and a status
lower, than hard and unrewarding work." ' The new behavior-related
rules of workfare aim "to build habits of responsible behavior."2 67 "Stripped
260 FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra note 39 at 269.
26I Vercellone, supra note 235, at 107.
262 JAMIE PECK, WORKFARE STATES 23 (2ooI). For a detailed study of neoliberal strategies
and policies directed at the poor in which race played a critical role, see JOE Ross ET AL., DIS-
CIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011);
Frances Fox Pivin, The New American PoorLaw, in THE CRISIS AND THE LEFT, supra note 217,
at so9.
263 R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT I (2000).
264 See Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 STAN. L. &
PoL'Y. REV. 57 (1998). Women were disproportionately impacted by the changes in the welfare
systems. For details, see SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN: WOMEN IN THE AGE OF
WELFARE REFORM 7-8 (2004).
265 Other legislations that invoked "responsibility" include Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-2o8, I io Stat. 3009-546 (1996) and Stu-
dent Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2oo9, H. R. 322 1, 11 Ith Cong. (2009).
z66 FRANCES Fox PIVEN AND RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: ThIE FUNCTIONS
OF PUBLIC WELFARE 396 (1993).
267 Douglas J. Besharov & Karen N. Gardiner, Paternalism and Welfare Reform, 122 PUB.
INTEREST, Winter 1996, at 70, 84 (1996). Conservative scholars continue to cite morals
rather than the economy as the cause of socio-economic deciine and tising inequality. See, eg,
CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: "IiE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA 1960-2010 (2012). Converse-
ly, perceptive scholars had noted a generation ago that social disruptions among the urban
poor, was due to drastic shrinkage of blue-collar jobs in urban areas. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: TIE NEW WORLD OF THE URBAN POOR (1996).
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down to its labor-regulatory essence," workfare seeks "to make 'docile
bodies' for the new economy: flexible, self-reliant, and self-disciplining."' 68
Under neoliberalism, responsibilization emerged as the dominant
register of subject-formation. Responsibilization turns on the ubiquitous
neoliberal construct of "human capital. ' 69 Through the lens of human
capital, wage is not the selling of labor power but an income from a special
type of capital. This capital is integral to the person who possesses it and
consists of both physical predispositions and the skills acquired as a result
of "investments" in education, training, and physical capacity."' This focus
on predispositions and acquired capacities raises troubling questions of race,
genetics, family, and class.2"' In the "human capital" discourse, a human
being is deemed a "machine-stream ensemble," a "capital-ability," indeed
"a machine that produces." 272 This actively responsible agent is a subject
of the market and is obliged to enhance her quality of life through her
own decisions. In this schema, everyone is an expert on herself, responsible
for managing her own human capital to maximal effect. A politics of the
self emerges wherein we are all induced to "work on ourselves" outside
the purview of the social. 73 This biopolitical governmentality produces
a subject to represent herself as enough for herself, complete and self-
268 PECK, WORKFARE STATES, supra note 262, at 6.
269 The canonical texts of the human capital paradigm are GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPI-
TAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION ( 2d
ed.I975); GARY BECKER, h ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 169-250 (1976); ECo-
NOMICS OF THEFAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND HUMAN CAPITAL (Theodore W. Schultz, ed.,
1974); Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capitak A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9
(1962); John G. Haaga, The Biology of Behavior and the Study of Human Fertility: A Review Essay,
29 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 505 (2003); Arleen Leibowitz, Home Investments in Children 82 J.
POL. ECON. 111 (1974); Theodore W. Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POL. ECON.
571 (196o); Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. I (1961).
During the neoliberal era, the bible of the human capital theme was a book sponsored by the
consulting firm Arthur Anderson. BRIAN FRIEDMAN ET AL., DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE: How
TO ATTRACT, MANAGE, AND RETAIN HUMAN CAPITAL (1998).
270 For a detailed exposition of the argument that central to contemporary strategies for
governing is to produce subjects that are required to conduct themselves responsibly and to
be free at maximize one's life as a kind of enterprise, see NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE SOUL:
I YE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF (1989). This broad strategy is tied to neoliberalism, which
[clreated another rationality for government in the name of freedom, and invented
or utilized a range of techniques that would enable the state to divest itself of
many of its obligations, devolving those to quasi-autonomous entities that would
be governed at a distance by means of budgets, audits, standards, benchmarks, and
other technologies that were both autonomizing and responsibilizing.
Nikolas Rose et al., Governnientality, 2 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 83, 91 (zoo6).
271 FOUCAULT,-THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra note 39, at 227-30.
272 Id. at 224-25.
273 See Mitchell Dean, Governing the Unemployed Self in an Active Society, 24 ECON. & Soc'Y
559(1995).
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sufficient: a "narcissistic separation of living labor from the public
sphere ... [where] labor becomes individual business and/or human capital."274
As welfare safety nets are removed, workers are induced to think of
themselves as free-standing businesses that shield themselves, much as
corporations do, by measuring and apportioning risks and by diversifying
operations and investments.275  Indeed, cheerleaders of neoliberal
globalization are rather explicit: "We're all entrepreneurs now, or should
be." '276 Risk, which was deemed harmful and needed careful calculation and
management by actuarial experts,277 is now represented as an opportunity
to be negotiated, cultivated, and exploited by the entrepreneurial financial
subject.7 8 Ideologues of neoliberalism warn against "diffusing, equalizing,
concealing, shuffling, smoothing, evading, relegating, and collectivizing
the real risks" and argue "with more of the risks borne by the individual
citizens .. .the overall system may be more stable."279 This assemblage
of the risk-taking entrepreneur is facilitated by attendant discourses of
rational economic actors, efficient and self-correcting markets, and the
ostensibly tamed business cycle.280 This calls forth a particular subjectivity
by demanding that individuals increasingly act as entrepreneurial investor
subjects as part of a wider individualization of risk. 1l In this schema, "a
personal loan was taking responsibility for life's uncertainties." '
274 Chicchi, supra note 243, at 149 (parentheses omitted).
275 For a detailed analysis, see Colin Gordon, The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Mi-
chel Foucault on Rationality and Government, in MAX WEBER, RATIONALITY AND MODERNITY 293
(Scott Lash & Sam Whimster eds., 1987).
276 Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., TheStart-Up Of You, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 201 , at A27.
Friedman added:
The old paradigm of climb up a stable career ladder is dead and gone.... No ca-
reer is a sure thing anymore. The uncertain, rapidly changing conditions in which
entrepreneurs start companies is what it's now like for all of us fashioning a career.
Therefore you should approach career strategy the same way an entrepreneur ap-
proaches starting a business.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid Garrett Hoffman, founder of,
Linkedln).
277 Liz McFal1, The Disinterested Self: The Idealized Subject of Life Assurance, 21 CULTURAL
STUD. 591, 602-05 (2007); Thomas Wainwright, Elite Knowledges: Framing Risk and the Geogra-
phies of Credit, 43 ENV'T & PLAN. A 650, 653-61 (2oi I).
278 Shaun French & James Kneale, Excessive Financialisation: Insuring Lifestyles, Enliven-
ing Subjects, and Everyday Spaces of Biosocial Excess, 27 ENV'T & PLAN. D: Soc. & SPACE 1030,
1031, 1037-45 (2009).
279 GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY I1 (ICS Press 1993) (1981).
z8o For the telatiotship between the efficient market hypothesis atd the financial crisis,
see GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT BUBBLES AND
THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY 25-37 (2oo8).
281 Paul Langley, The Making of Investor Subjects in Anglo-American Pensions, 24 ENV'T &
PLAN. D: Soc. & SPACE 919, 923-26 (20O6).
282 HYMAN, supra note 165, at 75-
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With the neoliberal call for individuals to secure their freedom,
autonomy and security through financial markets and not the state,
practices of investment, calculation and speculation became signs of
-initiative, self-management, and enterprise. Neoliberal economic theory
rests on the notion of the "'rational individual,' a fantastic creature that
aims exclusively at private gain, has no altruism and strictly calculates the
necessary means to achieve desired ends.""z Eliding the fact that much
of human behavior is irrational, 4 neoliberalism expects individuals to
rationally evaluate risk. Indeed, in the neoliberal ensemble, "risk itself
is being more positively evaluated," '285 with the result that "investment
appears as the most rational form of saving." ' 6 In the assemblage of
investor/entrepreneur subjectivity, "[wlithout significant capital, people
are being asked to think like capitalists." '287 The consolidation of finance
as a way of life introduces "a new set of signals ... as to how life is to be
lived and what it is for."2 ' Everyday life is increasingly framed as a space of
investment, and the individual is positioned as an investor in a life project
to continuously pursue opportunities and negotiate risks in the expectation
of rewards. One is engulfed by information about finance in the news
media, particularly the ubiquitous stock market ticker-tape on television,
that "breathe[s] life into finance, turning it into a living organism. ' 289 Tying
everyday practices to global financial networks-retirement plans, pensions,
purchase of goods on credit, repayment of credit bills, credit cards, student
loans, and mortgages-induces the self-fashioning of financial subject
283 Costas Lapavitsas, Mainstream Economics in the Neoliberal Era, in NEOLIBERALISM: A
CRITICAL READER 30, 35 (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston eds., 2005).
284 For studies on irrationality of human behavior, see GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J.
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MAT-
TERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009) (arguing that "animal spirits"-like confidence and fear,
corruption and fairness - influence human decisions and drive worldwide financial events);
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF
APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1996) (arguing that rational choice theory has not offered
empirically useful results and demonstrating its inconsistencies in the context of voter turnout
and social dilemmas); ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL AR-
GUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS '"IIUMPH 132 (Ist ed. 1977) (arguing that "capitalism was
supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature"); PETER
A. UBEL, FREE MARKET MADNESS: WHY HUMAN NATURE IS AT ODDS WITH ECONOMICS-AND WHY
IT MATTERS (2009) (arguing that irrational human behavior undermines the premise of free-
choice economics, particularly in the context of decisions involving health and well-being).
285 PAT O'MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND GOVERNMENT 131 (2004).
286 PAUL LANGLEY, THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: SAVING AND BORROWING IN
ANGLO-AMERICA 47 (2OO8).
287 RANDY MARTIN, FINANCIALIZATION OF DAILY LIFE 12 (2002).
288 Id. at 17; see also Nicholas J. Kiersey, Everyday Neoliberalism and the Subjectivity of Cri-
sis: Post-Political Control in an Era of Financial Turmoil, J. OF CRITICAL GLOBALISATION STUD.,
201 I, at 23, 36-38 .
289 Gordon L. Clark et al., Performing Finance: The Industry, the Media and Its Image, I I
REV. OF INT'L POL. ECON. 289, 298 (2004).
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positions and identities. In this context, finance becomes "a way of working
money over, and ultimately, a way of working over oneself."' 0 Finance,
then, by constituting a primary frame of interpellation of subjectivity,
became a primary "technology of the self," 9' and financialization becomes
"a practice of social control. . . . compatible with democratic societies
where order is based on the formalized participation of great masses." '
The "command devices" of this practice exist in "the hybrid zone where
the political economy meets social psychology."193 In the wake of the
displacement of the welfare state by neoliberal reordering of the economy,
personal well-being and financial security becomes increasingly bound up
with the fortunes of the international financial markets through pensions,
mortgages, and stocks." 4 The result is inescapability of finance as everyday
life becomes increasingly financialized.2 95 It leads individuals to believe
that their well-being depends more on financial markets than on demands
for higher wages and claims on public resources. In this context, to be
a leveraged mortgage debtor is to be a responsible and self-disciplined
entrepreneur.
The Keynesian productivity-wage and production-mass consumption
connections are substituted with a debt-consumption connection driven
by the so-called wealth-effect, an evocative instrument of this mode
of control and discipline. The wealth-effect is tied to the emergence of
"an asset economy," which, in turn, results in a "'patrimonialization' of
behaviors." 96 The wealth-effect, "a sort of illusory social insurance for the
crumbling of Fordist social security" '97 induced by increases in asset value,
particular stocks, and housing, "affects consumption behaviors more than
the expected wealth due to an increase in wages."' 18 Indeed, debtors often
harvested the wealth-effect, further fueling aggregate demand: cash-out
volumes for all prime conventional loans amounted to $26 billion in 2000
290 MARTIN, supra note 287, at 17; see also ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: How REAL ESTATE
CAME TO OWN Us 38 (2009).
291 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: A SEMINAR
WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 16, 17 (Luther H. Martin et al. eds., 1988).
292 Stefano Lucarelli, Financialization as Biopower, in CRISIS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
FINANCIAL MARKETS, SOCIAL STRUGGLES, AND NEW POLITICAL SCENARIOS 119, 120 (Andrea Fu-
magalli & Sandro Mezzadra eds., zoIo).
293 Id. at 119-20.
294 For detailed expositions, see MARTIN, supra note 287, at 17; Shaun French & Andrew
Leyshon, The New, New Financial System? Towards a Conceptualization of Financial Reinternedia-
tion, I I REV. OF INT'L POL. ECON. 263, 280-84 (2004).
295 See ROB AITKEN, PERFORMING CAPITAL: TOWARD A CULTURAL ECONOMY OF POPULAR
AND GLOBAL FINANCE 113-39 (2007).
296 Paulr6, supra note 241, at 193.
297 Chicchi, supra note 243, at 147.
298 Lucarelli, supra note 292, at 125.
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and reached $318 billion in 2006.299 In effect, the working classes "used
asset-growth to substitute for wage-growth. '310
In this context, for the risk-taking entrepreneurial subject, borrowing
and living with debt appear both essential and rational. Living with debt,
however, is living in a "credit panopticon,' '30 1 with disciplining effects both
at the inception of debt and through its career. The disciplinary controls
of standardization and synchronization exercised through the "credit
panopticon" displace trust as a grounds for lending. Critical to note here
is that credit scoring did not aim at exclusion of deviants but provided the
grounds for inclusion and differentiation in mortgage lending, a development
critical for reverse redlining. Credit scoring knowledge produced- debtors
sorted, targeted and governed through the prism of risk-based pricing. 3°2 It
also produced new forms of responsible and entrepreneurial self-discipline
and mortgagors as leveraged investor subjects. In this context, charging
higher interest rates to racial minorities became seemingly rational and
above political questioning.3 3 Finally, the subprime mortgage market
partook of the benefits of the neoliberal phenomenon of responsibilization
of entrepreneurial self, whereby individuals were induced to provide for
299 DUMtNIL & Lgvy, supra note 66, at 151 (citing FREDDIE MAC, CASH-OUT REFINANCE
REPORT (2oo8)). While predatory lending has received scholarly attention, perceptive scholars
have identified "predatory borrowing," where speculative borrowers took advantage of easy
credit and a rising property market. See cummings, supra note 2o, at 181-83.
300 HYMAN, supra note I65, at 4.
301 DAWN BURTON, CREDIT AND CONSUMER SOCIETY 53 (2OO8). A panopticon is a type of
institutional building designed by philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth cen-
tury that allows a watchman to observe all inmates of the institution without the inmates
being able to tell whether or not they are being watched. Bentham's idea of a panopticon was
very influential in the designs of modern prisons. For details, see JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon
Letters, in THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29 (Miran BoioviS ed., 1995); MICHEL FOUCA.ULT, DIs-
CIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books
2d ed. 1995) (1977).
302 For details, see Herbert Kalthoff, Practices of Calculation: Economic Representations and
Risk Management, THlEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y, Apr. 2005, at 69, 70; Paul Langley, Consumer Credit,
Self-Discipline, and Risk Management, in MANAGING FINANCIAL RISKS: FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL
z8o (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2OO9); Andrew Leyshon & Nigel Thrift, Lists Come Alive:
Electronic Systems of Knowledge and the Rise of Credit-Scoring in Retail Banking, 28 ECON. & SoC'Y
434, 443-450 (1999); Donncha Marron, 'Lending by Numbers': Credit Scoring and the Constitution
of Risk Within American Consumer Credit, 36 ECON. & Soc'Y 103 (2007); Wainwright, supra note
277, at 650.
303 For detailed analyses, see STEPHEN Ross & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT:
MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT
223-227 (2002); Elvin K. Wyly et al., American Home: Predatory Mortgage Capital and Neighbour-
hood Spaces of Race and Class Exploitation in the United States, 88 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER 105,
107 (2006); Elvin K. Wyly et al., Race, Gender, and Statistical Representation: Predatory Mortgage
Lending and the US Community Reinvestment Movement, 39 ENV'T & PLAN. A 2139, 2140 (2007).
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their own freedom and security through opportunities offered by the
market.304
The marketing of credit is built around the time-and-space-specific
constructs of the "normal" consumer held within financial institutions.
30 5
These normative expectations inform profiles of consumers including
embedded understandings of normalcy and deviance.3 6 Therefore, in
order to qualify for debt, a borrower has to demonstrate subscription to
such standards of normalcy. Internalizing such constructions of normalcy,
debtors who use credit disproportionately "feel affluent" and think of
themselves as "ordinary.3 7 Once indebted, debtors become subjected
to normalization by debt and are less likely to claim nonconformist views
or indulge in nonconformist conduct. 308 It was noted as early as the 1920s
that debt-encumbered homeowners are less likely to go on strike.3 9 Later,
during the neoliberal era, Greenspan echoed that the more debts workers
have, the less free they are to strike. 310 Conformity with rules of the new
financial and labor markets renders the debtor a responsible subject called
forth by neoliberalism. 11 -Thus disciplined, the atomized and self-sufficient
304 See Paul Langley, Sub-Prime Mortgage Lending: A Cultural Economy, 37 ECON. & Soc'Y
469, 486 (2oo8).
305 Traditionally, class, race and gender underscore construction of credit worthiness, as
credit standards are "geared towards affluent, white men." Louis HYMAN, supra note 165, at
173. For details of how credit rating systems have historically marginalized the poor, women
and racial minorities, see id. at 173-219.
306 See BURTON, supra note 180, at 53; see also David Knights et al., The Consumer Rules?:
An Examination of the Rhetoric and "Reality" of Marketing in Financial Services, 28 EUR. J. OF
MARKETING 42 (1994); Leyshon & Thrift, supra note 302, at 455-61 (1999).
3 07 HYMAN, supra note 165, at 155-56.
308 Stephen E.G. Lea et al., The Economic Psychology of Consumer Debt, 14 J. OF ECON.
PSYCHOL. 85, 85 (1993).
309 Ross, supra note 188, at 89; see also David Harvey, The Urban Roots of Financial Crises:
Reclaiming the City forAnti-Capitalist Struggle, in THE CRISIS AND THE LEFr, supra note 217, at 15.
310 AMATO & FANTACc, supra note 140, at 227.
311 Parents and teachers are encouraged to inculcate even in children "the problems
that can result from a poor credit rating." HOUSEHOLD FIN. CORP., MONEY MANAGEMENT: CHIL-
DREN'S SPENDING z8 (1968). Empirical studies find that serious debtors are less likely to claim
nonconformist views. Lea et al., supra note 308, at 85. Household heads who have outstanding
credit, and who have higher amounts of such debt, are significantly less likely to report com-
plete psychological wellbeing. The average increase in the psychological distress is greater
when outstanding credit is measured at the individual, as opposed to household, level. Sarah
Brown et al., Debt andDistress: Evaluatingthe Psychological Cost of Credit, 26 J. OF EcON. PSYCHOL.
642, 645 (2005). Rising tuition has led to increased student indebtedness and a decline in
student satisfaction with the education they receive. Hilary Metcalf, Payingfor University: The
Impact of Increasing Costs on Student Employment, Debt and Satisfaction, 191 NAT'L INST. ECON.
REV. Io6 (2005). Those from lower income groups are more debt averse than those from other
social classes, and are far more likely to be deterred from going to university because of their
fear of debt. Claire Callender & Jonathan Jackson, Does the Fear of Debt Deter Students from
Higher Education?, 34 J. OF Soc. PoL:Y 509, 520 (2005). Debt affects students' academic de-
cisions during college, and causes graduates to choose substantially higher-salary jobs and
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subject of the market becomes incompatible with projects of solidarity,
collective rights, and anti-subordination."'
VI. JUST IN CASE: HYPER-EXTENDED PENAL APPARATUS
To be on the safe side, the neoliberal order did not leave the project
of disciplining the working classes entirely to debt. It complemented the
"invisible hand" of the precarious labor market and burdens of debt with
the "iron fist" of the penal state.313 Indeed, mass incarceration and a "plague
of prisons" have become a defining feature of the neoliberal age.314
Betraying "an eerie similarity" between criminal justice and welfare
reform,31 the neoliberal era is marked by a "culture of control,"
316
reduces the probability that students choose low-paid "public interest" jobs. Jesse Rothstein
& Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained After College: Student Loans and Early-Career Occupational
Choices, 95 J. OF PUB. ECON. 149, 150 (2011). Financial issues constrain lower income group
students' choice of university far more than those from other social classes. Claire Callender
& Jonathan Jackson, Does the Fear of Debt Constrain Choice of University and Subject of Study, 33
STUD. IN HIGHER EDUC. 405, 409 (2008). Housing payment problems have independent psy-
chological costs over and above those associated with general financial hardship, and the mag-
nitude of the effect is similar to that shown for marital breakdown and job loss. Mark P. Taylor
et al., The Psychological Costs of Unsustainable Housing Commitments, 37 PSYCHOL. MED. 1027, 1034
(2007). Note that the connection between debt-driven home-ownership and self-discipline
had been argued at least since the early twentieth century. For example, a leading campaigner
against liberalization of divorce laws argued that "[tihe industrial world should see that its
fundamental needs of industry, efficiency, fidelity to tasks, and loyalty to all demands of the
situation require qualifications of mind and character that depend very largely on the home
behind the workman . 3 ARTHUR W, CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 197-98 (1919) (quoting Rev. Samuel Dike).
312 The overarching political impact has been captured well by the following:
The bases of prosperity shifted from the social democratic formula of working
classes supported by government intervention to the neoliberal conservative one
of banks, stock exchanges and financial markets. Ordinary people played their part,
not as workers seeking to improve their situation through trade unions, legislation
protecting employment rights and publically funded social insurance schemes, but
as debt-holders, participants in credit markets. The fundamental political shift
was more profound than anything that could be produced by alternations between
nominally social democratic and neoliberal conservative parties in government as
the result of elections. In has imparted a fundamental rightward shift to the whole
political spectrum, as the collective and individual interests of everyone are tied to
the financial markets, which in their own operations act highly unequally, produc-
ing extreme concentrations of wealth.
COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NoN-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 116 (201 I).
313 Pierre Bourdieu makes a parallel analogy by way of "the left hand" of the state,
which protects and expands life chances through Keynesian welfare, and is supplanted by the
"right hand," that of coercion. PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY
OF THE MARKET 1- 0 (1998).
314 ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION
IN AMERICA 38 (201 I).
315 JOEL F HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 137 (1995)"
316 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CON-
TEMPORARY SOCIETY 196-198 (2OO1).
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"penalisation of poverty,"317 and an "enlargement and exaltation of the
penal sector" of the state. 318 A renewed deployment of the penal apparatus
"increase[es] the cost of strategies of exit into the informal economy
of the street" and "neutralizes and warehouses" its most disruptive
factions or those "rendered wholly superfluous" by the new economy.3 19
While' between '1950 and 1970 the imprisonment rate declined, it saw
an exponential boom after 1975.320 Between 1975 and 2000, the total
incarcerated population increased by 500 percent.3 1 In the United -States
today, over seven million adults are subjected to the correctional system,
including 2,266,800 incarcerated and 4,887,900 under criminal justice
supervision outside prisons.3"' Racial minorities and the economically
marginalized constitute disproportionate parts of this population.3"3 Since
1975, "corrections" posted the fastest expansion in public expenditures
and has become the third largest employer in the U.S.324 As public housing
has been dismantled in large part as part of welfare reform, prisons have
"effectively [become] the country's main public housing program.32 3 In tune
with the neoliberal agenda of turning the state into a market-state, the
penal system has been increasingly privatized. For-profit private prisons,
317 Loic Wacquant, The Penalisation of Poverty and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism, 9 EUR. J. OF
CRIM. PoCY & RES. 401,401 (2OOI).
318 LoYc WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL IN-
SECURITY 305 (English Language ed., Duke Univ. Press 2009) (2004). It has been noted that
"the poverty of the social state against the backdrop of deregulation elicits and necessitates
the grandeur of the penal state." Loic Wacquant, Ordering Insecurity: Social Polarization and the
Punitive Upsurge, 11 RADICAL PHIL. REV. 1, 19 (2008).
319 Id. at 8. For the political and economic history that frames the enhanced incarcera-
tion, see AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION (Mary
Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008); GLENN C. LOURY ET AL., RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERI-
CAN VALUES 1-37 (2008); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); CHRISTIAN PARENTI,
LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS (1999).
320 WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 318, at 117 fig. I.
321 Id. at 115 tbl.6. By 2001, 1,319,000 adults were incarcerated and 1,334,000 were
under criminal justice supervision outside prisons. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, PREVALENCE OF IM-
PRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001 I, 1-2 (2003), available at http://permanent.
access.gpo.gov/lps62432/piuspo I.pdf.
322 LAUREN E. GLAZE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 20IO, at 3 tbl. i,
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus Io.pdf.
323 Id. at 8, app. tbl.3 . For detailed analyses of intersections of race and incarceration, see
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLIND-
NESS (2010); DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995); Loic WACQUANT, DEADLY SYMBIOSIS: RACE AND THE RISE OF THE PENAL STATE
(2009); Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. Soc. REV. 151 (2004).
324 WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 318, at 153.
325 Id. at 16o. For the inverse relationship between expenditures on public housing and
corrections, see id. at 160 fig.4.
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reinstituted in 1983 after having been outlawed in 1925, saw an exponential
growth, yielding handsome profits for the burgeoning industry.3 6 In
line with replacing taxes with user-fees, federal and state governments
increasingly adopted "carceral taxation" to have inmates pay for the cost
of'their own incarceration. 32 7 Coercive discipline, of course, begins in the
streets. The "militarization" of the American police that started with the
"war on drugs" and accelerated with the "war on terror" was on display as
the Occupy Movement erupted in late 2011.38
For the working classes, the expanded deployment of the penal arm
of the state increases the cost of not participating in the increasingly
precarious labor markets. The prospect of falling off the treadmill of the
financialized debt-driven becomes more frightening than ever. This further
substantiates the position that law and the state remain critical enablers of
subject-forming governmenialities.
CONCLUSION
This article has. combined insights of critical political economy
with Michel Foucault's constructs of governmentality, bio-power, and
assemblage of self-caring subjects to explore the symbiosis of debt and
discipline in the neoliberal era. Laws and public policy were indispensable
for choreographing the displacement of Keynesian welfare by the hegemony
of finance capital, the hallmark of neoliberalism. Strategic use of monetary
policy and radical rearrangement of legal regimes facilitated financialization
of the economy, broke the power of organized labor, and expanded debt
to sustain aggregate demand. Financial markets extended their reach and
expanded liquidity by bringing ever-increasing sections of the working
classes within the ambit of the credit economy. Faced with shrinking
welfare, wage pressures, and precarious labor markets, working classes had
little choice but to fund their basic needs through debt. The subprime
mortgage boom testifies to this structural transformation. Neoliberal
rationalities procreated constructs ofindividual responsibility and human
capital that facilitated assemblage of subjects who were coaxed to engage
the financialized economy as risk-taking entrepreneurs. Engulfment in
relationships of debt induced self-discipline and conformity with the logic
of the financialized economy and precarious labor markets. Neoliberal
326 For growth of private imprisonment, see id. at 170 fig.5; see also Alexis M. Durham
III, Origins and Interest in the Privatization of Punishment: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
American Experience, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1989); Charles H. Logan & Sharla P. Rausch, Punish
and Profit: The Emergence of Priate Enterprise Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303 (1985).
327 WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR, supra note 318, at 172; see also'Erica Goode, Inmate
Visits Now Carry Added Cost in Arizona, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, at AIO; Jennifer Medina, In
California, a Plan to Charge Inmates for Their Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, at A 15.
328 At Baker, When the Police Go Military, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at SR6.
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financialization of the economy, thus, has transformed capitalism and
recruited within its modes of governance the transformation of subjectivity.
Neoliberalism emerges as a regime of immanent social control through
the market. Public policies drew the frame for conventions and norms of
social practice and shaped the horizon within which individuals pursued
strategies of economic survival and security. State power created a field of
possibility within which market governmentality instilled in the subject
an understanding of herself as capital. To live and survive in the debt-
fueled financialized economy, this understanding had to be reproduced in
practices of daily life. This ensemble sutured debt'with discipline.
For three decades, neoliberal financializationcombinedwithglobalization
contained the crisis of profitability and produced debt-encumbered self-
disciplined working classes. In the process, however, it sowed the seeds of
a larger crisis. Syphoning of savings from the periphery to sustain demand
in the core and securitization of subprime mortgages to generate liquidity
had its limits. Pushed beyond the frontiers of sustainability, this empire
of debt collapsed. Securitization of debt, designed to spread risk, now
spread contagion. The result was the 2008 global financial meltdown and
the resulting Great Recession. This trajectory underscores the history of
capitalism; it never solves its foundational contradictions and tendencies to
crisis, it only transforms them.
The magnitude of the ongoing crisis created by neoliberal
financialization is alarming. The global losses of the financial sector exceed
3.4 trillion dollars,32 9 and the bill for public rescue of financial institution
exceeds 20 trillion dollars.330 Worldwide, over 50'million jobs were lost,331
200 million working people slipped below the poverty line, and high
unemployment has become the "new normal." 33 Value of derivatives at
596 trillion dollars dwarfs the entire world output of 48.6 trillion dollars. 3
By 2014, government debtof G20 countries is projected to be 120 percent
of GDP.334 The credit worthiness of the U.S. stands questioned and the
329 INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING THE
FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD 5 (2009), available at. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
gfsr/zoo9/o2/pdf/text.pdf.
330 UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2010, Xii-Xiii (zolO),
available at http://www.un.org/en/developmentldesa/policy/wesp/wvesp-archive/20Iowesp.
pdf.
331 Nelson D. Schwartz, Unemployment Surges Around the World, Threatening Stability, N.Y.
TIMES, February 15, 2009, at Ai.
.332 Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Felice Noelle Rodriguez, Structural Causes and Conse-
quences of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis, in AFTERMATH: A NEw GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER? 97,
109-I IO (Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluguian eds., 2011) (reporting ILO estimates)
333 FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 5, 229.
334 Manuel Castells, The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Towards a New Economic Culture?, in
BUSINESS As USUAL: THE ROOTS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWN .185, 199 (Craig Cal-
houn & Georgi Derluguian eds., (2011).
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status of the dollar as the dominant global currency is in jeopardy. The
policy responses to the crisis thus far are consistent with the track record
of the last three decades: using crises to reinforce the priority of financial
institutions and bondholders over the well-being of working classes.335
The myriad policy responses have stubbornly refused to ease the debt
burdens of consumers and sovereigns, lest the disciplinary role of debt
falter. There have been five typical policy responses to the crisis thus far:
(1) massive injections of liquidity into the financial system and bailouts
of major financial institutions; (2) imposition of fiscal discipline through
austerity measures, turning governments into collection agencies for the
bond markets; (3) accelerated hollowing out of welfare systems and further
pressure on wages; (4) activation of racist xenophobia to recalibrate the
boundaries of legitimate membership in society;.and (5) acceleration of
militarization and use of direct violence both locally and globaily.
The crisis and the policy responses have triggered resistance from
below. From the Arab Spring to Greek general strikes and from the Occupy
Wall Street Movement in the U.S. to mass demonstrations in London, new
spaces and modes of resistance are being forged. However, finding a way
to respond to the disciplinary function of debt is yet to achieve priority on
the agendas of these movements. It is imperative that theory and praxis
aimed at emancipatory transformation and global justice take account of
the nature and magnitude of the contemporary crisis and the implications
of policy responses on the offer. In particular, we must focus on how to deal
with the new and refurbished disciplinary regimes.that are reinforcing the
discipline of debt through national policies to transfer all costs of the crisis
to the working classes and the marginalized. Popular democratization of
finance through management of finance as a public utility must be high
on the agenda of popular movements. An urgent challenge is to explore
agendas, coalitions, and organizational forms of resistive social movements
suitable to pursue popular democratization of finance. Also needed are
designs of political and economic governance conducive to organizing
banking and finance as public utilities. The current crisis has opened up
the possibility of alternative social orders and modes of life. What shape
the future will take depends in no small measure on how contending social
forces will confront the perennial question of finance and the relationship
between debt and discipline.
335 For details, see PAUL KRUGMAN, END TIis DEPRESSION Now! (2o12).
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